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Clerk of the Court
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Appellant's Citation of Supplemental Authorities
Robert C. Brady & Marjorie Brady v. Randall B.
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Gibb,

Dear Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, appellant Dr. Randall B. Gibb submits this Citation of
Supplemental Authorities.
On March 30, 1994, the Supreme Court of Utah filed its
opinion in Turner v. Nelson, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah 1994). A
courtesy copy accompanies this letter. This case is a pertinent and
significant authority to supplement Point III of Appellant's Brief,
titled "The Trial Court Erred in Permitting Dr. Barry Cook to
Testify," subpart A, "Dr. Cook Was Not a Proper Rebuttal Witness,"
pages 30-39, subpart C, "Dr. Cook Was a Surprise Witness Who Should
Not Have Been Permitted to Testify," pages 40-43, and also Point IV
of Appellant's Reply Brief, "Dr. Cook Was Not a Proper Rebuttal
Witness Because His Testimony Was Used to Contradict Evidence That
Could Have Been Reasonably Anticipated Prior to Trial," pages 7-8.
The significance of this supplemental citation is its
support for appellant's position with respect to disclosure of all
potential witnesses in advance of trial and the standards for proper
rebuttal testimony at trial.
Very truly yours,
RICHARDS,yflRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON/ /-\ t 1

Nathan R. Hyde
NRH/kr
Enclosure
cc: Curt Drake
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declarant:
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the
subject matter of the declarant's statement despite
an order of the court to do so;
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if
the . . . refusal . . . is due to the procurement or
wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's
statement for the purpose of preventing the
witness from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness:
(I) Former testimony. Testimony given as a
witness at another hearing of the same or a
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in
compl iance with the law in the course of the same
or another proceeding, if the party against whom
the testimony is now offered . . . had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or
redirect
examination.
Utah R. Evid. 804.
6. In concluding that the trial court did not commit
plain error in admitting victim impact evidence, we do
not decide whether victim impact evidence is
admissible under the Utah Constitution. See State v.
Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 39 n.38 (March 2,
1994). Furthermore, in light of the fact that we
recently held for the first time that section 76-3-207 of
the Code prohibits the introduction of victim impact
evidence, id. at 32-33, we cannot conclude that the
trial court committed plain error when it admitted the
evidence at issue here in a trial held before our recent
pronouncement. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 120809 (Utah 1993).
7. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart takes aim
at the majority's failure to address each of defendant's
forty-four claims of error. We note that the sheer
number of errors alleged is no measure of the merits
of those claims. The majority has dealt with those
claims of error that are deserving of attention.
Justice Stewart also asserts that the trial court's
instruction on the State's burden of proof was
undeniably in error, citing State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d
1141, 1147-48 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in
the result, joined by Zimmerman and Durham, JJ.),
and State v. Ireland, 113 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah
1989). In his Johnson opinion, decided after this case
was tried, when faced with an instruction in all
pertinent respects identical to the instruction at issue
here, Justice Stewart concluded that although the
instruction was incorrect, it did "not rise to the level
of reversible error." 774 P.2d at 1147 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the result, joined by Zimmerman &
Durham, JJ.).
More importantly, however, we note that the
instant instruction was proper under legal principles in
place at the time it was given. Two months before
Menzies went to trial, this court approved a
reasonable doubt instruction substantively identical to
the one at issue here in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d
546, 572-73 (Utah 1987). It was not until one year
after Menzies' trial that we expressed in Johnson and
Ireland our disapproval of the "weighty affairs" and
"possible or imaginary" language. Despite Justice
Stewart's suggestion to the contrary, this change in the
law is not entitled to retroactive application under our
holding in State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577 (Utah 1983),
overruled on other grounds. State v. Hansen, 734

P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986). In Norton, we recognized
that "when this Court established a new rule of law on
an essential element of a crime, a criminal defendant
whose direct appeal was pending was entitled to the
benefit of the new rule for the resolution of his
appeal." Id. at 583. We went on to emphasize,
however, that the
automatic rule of retroactivity as to nonfinal
judgments only applies to significant changes of
rules that are not expressly declared to be
prospective in operation. This qualification is
necessary to prevent automatic retroactivity from
displacing the traditional rule that a new rule of
criminal procedure which constitutes "a clear
break from the past" will sometimes be
nonretroactive.
Id. at 584 (emphasis added) (citing United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982)). In Ireland, we
did indicate that the change in the beyond-areasonable-doubt-instruction law was not to be
retroactive. Specifically, the Ireland
court's
declaration that trial courts are to discontinue use of
the "weighty affairs" and "possible or imaginary"
language was made in the exercise of this court's
supervisory power over lower courts. 773 P.2d at
1380. This is a clear indication that we would strike
down only future verdicts based on the offending
language. We reemphasized our intention to do so in
Johnson, 114 P.2d at 1147 (Stewart, J., concurring in
the result, joined by Zimmerman & Durham, JJ.).
Because the invocation of our supervisory powers in
Ireland demonstrates a commitment on the part of this
court to prospectively prohibit the use of the offending
language, the Ireland!Johnson rule is not entitled to
retroactive application under our holding in Norton,
675 P.2d at 584..
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ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice:
Plaintiff Julie Anderson Turner appeals from
i jury verdict for defendant Amy Nelson on
Turner's negligence claim. Turner contends that
ihe trial court abused its discretion by not
allowing her to call a "rebuttal" witness whom
she had not listed on her pretrial designation of
witnesses. She further asserts that the trial court
erroneously allowed Nelson to add a nonparty,
Salt Lake City, to the verdict form in order to
have the jury apportion its fault. We affirm the
trial court.
This action arises from an automobile
accident. On July 6, 1989, Turner was traveling
west on Third Avenue near the Canyon Road
intersection in Salt Lake City. At about the same
time, Nelson was driving north on Canyon
Road. Turner contends that Nelson failed to
heed the "Stop Ahead" warning sign and then
ran the stop sign at the intersection of Canyon
Road and Third Avenue. Nelson's vehicle hit
Turner's vehicle on the front left quarter-panel.
Turner suffered physical injuries as a result.
Turner served Nelson with a complaint
alleging negligence on March 27, 1991. Nelson
answered the complaint and denied any
negligence. Her answer claimed, among other
things, that Turner was contributorily negligent
and that Turner's injuries were caused by the
negligence of unnamed third parties. Soon
thereafter, discovery commenced.
The trial court issued a scheduling order
setting February 20, 1992, as the discovery
cutoff date. The order required both parties, by
February 14th, to exchange designations of the
witnesses they planned to call at trial. Although
Nelson complied with that order, Turner filed
her designation on February 19th, five days late.
On February 26th, Nelson filed a "Motion for
Apportionment of Fault of Salt Lake City" and
an accompanying memorandum. She sought to
include Salt Lake City on the verdict form for
apportionment purposes, even though it was not
a defendant. Over Turner's objection, the trial
court granted the motion.
At trial, Turner presented evidence tending to
show that Nelson had been negligent in failing to
heed the stop sign. Conversely, Nelson
contended in opening arguments and throughout
trial that Salt Lake City was at fault because it
"had negligently designed" the intersection and
because it allegedly had allowed the stop sign to
become obstructed and perhaps bent, making the
sign difficult to see. The jury returned a verdict
of no negligence on the part of Nelson, from
which Turner appeals.1
Turner's first contention on appeal is that the
trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
allow the testimony of her "rebuttal" witness,
Jim Nakling. Turner acknowledges that Nakling
was not listed on her pretrial designation of
witnesses. She asserts, however, that the need
for Nakling's rebuttal testimony became
apparent only after trial began, a fact that

Specifically, Turner contends that she was
surprised by defense counsel's statements during
his opening remarks that the sign had been
partially obstructed and that Salt Lake City, not
Nelson, was really at fault. On the evening of
the first day of trial, Turner's counsel made an
effort to find a witness to testify that the sign
had not been obstructed. That same evening,
counsel found Nakling walking near the accident
site. Nakling had lived near the relevant
intersection for the past ten years. He
purportedly was prepared to testify that he had
walked his dog by the intersection twice a day
and the stop sign was not obstructed at the time
of the accident.
On the morning of the second day of trial.
Turner moved the court to allow Nakling's
testimony, and Nelson opposed that motion. The
court did not rule on the motion at that time. On
the third day of trial, Turner attempted to call
Nakling as a rebuttal witness, effectively
renewing the motion. Turner argued that the
testimony was properly admissible to rebut
Nelson's "new" contentions that the sign was
obstructed and perhaps had been replaced with
a larger sign since the accident and that Salt
Lake City was actually at fault. The court
refused to allow the testimony, stating:
I am persuaded that the motion to call the
new witness should be and is denied, and
my reasoning is as has been stated by
[Nelson's counsel}, but moreover, it has
been the essential defense here that the sign
was obstructed, thereby limiting the
Defendant's opportunity to timely observe it
and take appropriate action. That aspect of
[Guertz's] testimony is not new, and my
decision to allow Salt Lake City on the
verdict form for purposes of apportionment
of the responsibility here does not change
the essential defense that the sign was
obstructed. . . . [I]t seems to me that
[allowing the testimony in at this point in
the trial 1 puts [Nelson] at an unfair
disadvantage, not knowing who this
individual is and [not] having had the
opportunity to cross-examine or at least
depose this witness, while as Mr. Guertz
[Nelson's expert] was available and notified
in a timely fashion as far as the opposition
was concerned, that he would be testifying.
I am therefore persuaded that it would place
[Nelson] in an unfair posture to grant this
motion and it's denied.
Turner then proffered what Nakling would
testify to and sought a continuance to allow
Nelson an opportunity to depose Nakling. The
court denied the request and again refused to
allow the testimony.
The issue before us is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to allow
Nakling's testimony. We will not reverse the
trial court unless the appellant demonstrates that
the trial court has clearly abused its discretion
"" ' *k^»kv affppfpd the aDDellant's substantial
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that the "new testimony" could have been
anticipated. To meet this burden, she must
provide this court with a complete record of all
evidence relevant to the alleged error. Utah R.
App. P. 11(e)(2).4 In the absence of a complete
record "we assume that the proceedings at trial
were regular and proper." Bevan v. J.H. Constr.
Co., 669 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1983); see Smith
v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah 1985);
Stephens v. Schwendiman, 688 P.2d 466, 467
(Utah 1984); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998,
1002 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In the present case, Turner has failed to
provide this court with the necessary evidence.
She has not included in the record or with her
briefs copies of depositions, Nelson's answers to
interrogatories, or other evidence that could
support Turner's claim that Nelson's evidence
was new. This court must therefore assume that
the trial court was correct in its statement that
Nelson had asserted all along that the stop sign
was obstructed and the intersection poorly
designed and, by implication, that Salt Lake City
was negligent.
Moreover, the record seems to support
Nelson's assertion that Turner knew or should
have reasonably anticipated that Nelson would
claim the sign was obstructed.5 In fact, the
record suggests that if Turner failed to
appreciate the extent of Nelson's reliance on this
defense, it was probably because of Turner's
earlier failure to depose adequately several
adverse witnesses.
Nelson presented the evidence of at least three
witnesses, including herself, that the sign was
obstructed and the intersection poorly designed.
Nelson testified at trial that she was unable to
see the stop sign until just prior to entering the
intersection because the sign was partially
obstructed by foliage. Nelson also presented the
testimony of Mr. Rusk, a witness to the
accident. Rusk testified that at the time of the
accident, the stop sign was bent and partially
obscured by the limbs of a nearby tree.
Nelson further introduced the expert testimony
of Mr. Guertz, who before his retirement was a
"traffic design expert" with the Utah Department
of Transportation. Guertz testified that the
intersection was designed poorly for a variety of
reasons and that the stop sign might have been
replaced or moved since the accident.
Nelson's counsel had listed Guertz, Rusk, and
Nelson on their designation of witnesses and had
made them available for deposition. Turner
made no attempt to depose Guertz or, as far as
we can tell from the record before us, determine
through written interrogatories the content of his
testimony. Rusk apparently was deposed by
Nelson, and Turner was properly notified of that
deposition. It is unclear, however, whether
Turner's counsel chose to attend the deposition
or examine Rusk. Finally, Nelson was deposed
by Turner and during that deposition reportedly
indicated that the stop sign had been partially
obstructed. Once again, because Turner has not
provided us with a complete record, we have no
rrnr \ u < r\\/ \ sru
v
DirnnnTC

Albretsen, 782 P.2d 515, 518-19 (Utah 1989);
Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 924 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989); accord In re Estate of Gardner,
505 P.2d 50, 52 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); King
Pest Control v. Binger, 379 So. 2d 660, 663
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
As a threshold matter, it is well within a trial
court's authority to order the parties to disclose
all potential witnesses in advance of trial. See
Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah
1993); Hardy, 116 P.2d at 924-25. Such
disclosure serves a number of significant
purposes. See, e.g., Kott v. City of Phoenix, 763
P.2d 235, 238 (Ariz. 1988). It gives both parties
the opportunity to prepare adequately for trial,
including, among other things, deposing
witnesses, investigating witnesses' testimony,
and preparing an effective cross-examination.
See, e.g., Gardner, 505 P.2d at 52. It also
encourages the parties to make a serious effort
to investigate the facts and discover all relevant
witnesses in a timely manner. Finally, it furthers
the orderly and efficient administration of justice
by avoiding trial delays which might otherwise
be necessary to accommodate the need to
prepare for a surprise witness.
Given these significant policies, a trial court
does not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow
a party to call a surprise witness absent "good
cause" for the failure to disclose the witness as
required by a court order or rule.2 See Arnold,
846 P.2d at 1310; Hardy, 776 P.2d at 925.
When the offering party contends that the
undisclosed witness is necessary to rebut the
adverse party's evidence, the issue hinges on
whether the evidence "sought to be rebutted
could reasonably have been anticipated prior to
trial." 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §371, at 570 (1991)
(emphasis added);see, e.g.,Albretsen, 782 P.2d
at 518; 3 King Pest Control, 379 So. 2d at 663.
Turner offered Nakling's testimony for the
express purpose of contradicting Nelson's
evidence that the sign was obstructed and
perhaps bent. Turner contends that because
Nakling's testimony was intended to rebut this
"new, unforeseen" argument, the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to allow the
testimony. Turner's claim hangs on whether she
"could reasonably have anticipated" the
testimony of Nelson and Nelson's witnesses that
the sign was obstructed.
In deciding this issue, the trial court had all of
the evidence before it and was in the best
position to determine whether Turner could
reasonably have anticipated the obstructed-sign
testimony. As noted earlier, the trial court
indicated that the testimony regarding the
obstructed stop sign was "not new" and Nelson's
"essential defense" had always been that the sign
was obstructed. Although the trial court did not
specifically say that Turner "could reasonably
have anticipated" the testimony, the thrust of the
court's ruling is clear—Nelson's evidence was
foreseeable.
As appellant, Turner has the burden of
showing that the trial court erred in determining
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/ay of verifying this statement.6
Similarly, Turner's argument on appeal that
ialt Lake City's inclusion on the special verdict
orm created the necessity for Nakling's rebuttal
estimony is unpersuasive. According to Turner,
Oakling would have testified only that the sign
vas not obstructed, bent, or replaced since the
iccident. The trial court indicated that these
vere not new issues. In other words, regardless
Df Salt Lake City's presence on the special
verdict form, the trial court concluded that it
was foreseeable that Nelson would assert the
obstructed-sign defense and, thus, rebuttal
evidence would be necessary.7
Finally, given the ease with which Turner's
counsel located Nakling, there is no merit to the
argument that he was unavailable or
undiscoverable, as Turner seems to imply. By
Turner's own admission, Nakling had lived in
the area for ten years and walked by the
intersection twice a day. If Turner's counsel
could locate him in one night, counsel easily
could have found him in the months before trial.
In summary, there is nothing in the record
before us to indicate that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to admit the testimony
of the unlisted witness.
We next address whether the trial court
misinterpreted the Utah Liability Reform Act
(the "Act") in granting Nelson's motion to add
a nonparty, Salt Lake City, to the special verdict
form. As noted earlier, several days before trial
Nelson filed a "Motion for Apportionment of
Fault" and a supporting memorandum. The court
granted Nelson's motion, adding Salt Lake City
to the special verdict form on the first day of
trial.
According to Turner, the statutory scheme and
the plain language of the Act do not permit the
apportionment of negligence to nonparties. See
Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-38 to -41. Therefore,
the argument continues, the Act requires Nelson
to join the City as a party before it may be
added to the special verdict form. See id. This
would be an issue of first impression in Utah,
but we do not reach it.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Turner has
properly interpreted the Act, the presence of Salt
Lake City on the verdict form was harmless in
this case. The jury determined that Nelson was
not negligent. For that reason, the jury never
reached the issue of whether Turner herself or
Salt Lake City was negligent, and the jury never
apportioned fault between the parties. Turner
simply has not provided this court with a cogent
theory of how Salt Lake City's inclusion on a
portion of the special verdict form that the jury
never reached altered the facts, the presentation
of those facts, or the result in this case. Cf.
Beitzel v. City ofCoeurd'Alene, 827 P.2d 1160,
1164-65 (Idaho 1992).
Turner admits that Nelson was free to argue to
the jury that Salt Lake City was at fault,
regardless of whether the City was included on
the special verdict form. In fact, it is common
trial practice for a defendant to allege that a

third person, named or unnamed, party or
nonparty, is the real culprit. Turner does not
allege that the Act in any way restricts this
practice. Both parties presumably would have
presented the same evidence and made the same
arguments, even if Salt Lake City had not been
on the special verdict form.
Turner's real complaint seems to be that
Nelson allegedly concealed, until right before
trial, her obstructed-sign defense. Turner
apparently believes that this subterfuge is
highlighted by the late date of the motion to add
Salt Lake City to the special verdict form.
Nevertheless, Turner has not alleged or provided
evidence suggesting that Nelson in any way
distorted her answers to interrogatories, failed to
disclose her defense,
or
otherwise
misrepresented her position prior to trial. Nelson
timely listed all witnesses who testified, made
them available for discovery, and as far as the
record we have indicates, truthfully responded to
written interrogatories. It is not unusual or
inappropriate for a party to file a trial-related
motion in close proximity to the trial. In short,
if Turner believes that discovery abuses
occurred, that is a separate issue which she
should have raised at trial.
The jury determined that Nelson was not
legally negligent. Turner has failed to
demonstrate how the City's presence on a
portion of the special verdict form that was not
completed by the jury prejudiced her case. The
error, if any, was harmless. We affirm the trial
court.
WE CONCUR:
I. Daniel Stewart, Associate Chief Justice
Richard C. Howe, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Leonard H. Russon, Court of Appeals Judge
Hall, Justice, did not participate herein;
Russon, Judge, sat prior to his appointment to
this court.
1. The special verdict form instructed the jury as
follows:
Please answer the following questions from a
preponderance of the evidence. If you find the
evidence preponderates in favor of the issue
presented, answer "Yes." If you find that the
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot
determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if
you find that the evidence preponderates against
the issue presented, answer "No." Also, any
damages assessed must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.
1. Considering all of the evidence in this case,
do you find from a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant, Amy Nelson, was negligent as
alleged by the Plaintiff?
The form provided a space for the jury to check
either "Yes" or "No." The jury marked the "No" box.
The form also contained several other questions
relating to, inter alia, proximate cause and the
negligence of Turner<and Salt Lake City. The form,
however, required the jury to answer these questions
only if it found that Nelson had been negligent.
F DT?PTII?T<s
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Because it did not so find, the jury never reached
these issues
2. The present case is distinguishable from Board of
Education v Barton, 617 P 2d 347 (Utah 1980) In
Barton, the defendant alleged that the trial court had
abused its discretion in allowing the plaintiff to call a
witness not listed in the pretrial order Id at 349 This
court held, however, that the pretrial order, by its
terms, had expressly indicated that it did not require
the disclosure of rebuttal witnesses, and thus, it was
not improper to allow the testimony Id
In contrast, the pretrial order in the present case
required the parties to list all witnesses, without
differentiating between case-in-chief and rebuttal
witnesses Similarly, neither party's designation of
witnesses distinguished between types of witnesses
3. For example, in State v Albretsen the court applied
the "reasonably anticipated" test to the question of
undisclosed rebuttal testimony in a criminal trial 782
P2d 515, 516-18 (Utah 1989) In that case, the
prosecution obtained a handwritten statement from the
defendant's alibi witness, Ms Davis, several months
prior to trial Id at 516 Davis indicated in her
statement that she and the defendant had driven up a
local canyon into the mountains at the time of the
crime, she did not, however, give any specific details
regarding the drive Id Nevertheless, at trial Davis
testified regarding the precise route she and the
defendant had allegedly taken during their ride Id at
518 After her testimony, the prosecution introduced
the testimony of a state engineer who testified that the
route Davis claimed to have taken was impassible
during the time in question Id The defense objected
to the testimony, relying on a Utah law that requires
the prosecution, once it has been notified of the
defense's intent to offer alibi evidence or testimony,
to inform the defense prior to trial of witnesses the
State proposes to offer to contradict or impeach the
defendant's alibi testimony Id , see Utah Code Ann
§77-14-2(1) The trial court allowed the State's
testimony, and the defendant was convicted On
appeal, this court held that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in allowing the testimony "in
view of the fact that the State could not have
reasonably anticipated the discrepancy between
Davis's handwritten statement and her later testimony
at trial Albretsen, 782 P 2d at 518 (emphasis added)
4. "If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary
to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such
finding or conclusion " Utah R App P 11(e)(2)
(emphasis added)
5. In argument before the trial court on the motion to
allow Nakhng's testimony, Nelson's counsel stated
that (1) Nelson had indicated the sign was obstructed
in answers to interrogatories, (2) the issue of the
obstructed sign had been raised over and over in
Turner's deposition, and (3) Daniel Rusk, an
eyewitness to the accident, had indicated in his
deposition that the sign was obstructed Turner's
counsel did not refute these claims during the
argument before the trial court and has provided us
with no evidence to suggest that Nelson's counsel
incorrectly stated the facts
6. As noted earlier, in oral arguments before the trial
court regarding Turner's motion to allow Nakhng's
testimony, Nelson's counsel asserted that Nelson had,
in fact, indicated during her deposition that the stop
sign had been obstructed Turner's counsel did not
refute this assertion in his oral statement at trial
ITT1 A l l

7. As both parties correctly recognized during oral
argument, it is common practice and generally
appropriate for a defendant to assert that a third
person is liable, regardless of whether that party is
included on the verdict form
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court commit error by submitting

conflicting and prejudicially confusing jury instructions to the
jury?

The standard of review is a correctness standard.

The Carpet

Barn v. State Dep't of Trans.. 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
2.

Did the trial court commit error by permitting

Dr. Barry Cook to testify as a rebuttal witness?
review is an abuse of discretion standard.

The standard of

Soliz v. Ammerman. 395

P.2d 25 (Utah 1964).
3.

Did the trial court commit error by permitting

Dr. Cook to testify and by admitting Exhibits 64 and 65 because the
testimony and evidence constitutes prejudicial surprise?
standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard.

The
State in

Interest of LPS v. Stevens, 797 P.2d 1133 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
4.

Did the trial court commit error by finding that

Dr. Cook was qualified to testify and render opinions in this case?
The standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard.

Schindler

v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE RULES
1.

Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Addendum 5.)

1

(Attached as

2.
on evidence."
3.

Rule 103(a) and (d), Utah Rules of Evidence, "Rulings
(Attached as Addendum 6.)
Rule 104(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, "Questions of

admissibility generally."
4.
experts."

(Attached as Addendum 7.)

Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, "Testimony by

(Attached as Addendum 8.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.
Plaintiff/appellee Marjorie Brady ("Mrs. Brady") and her

husband, Robert Brady, filed suit against Utah Power and Light for
injuries suffered in an automobile accident, claiming that the
collision was the fault of a negligent UP&L employee.

(R. 1-3.)

Mrs. Brady later sued Mountain View Hospital, Dr. Randal B. Gibb
("Dr. Gibb") and Dr. Clisto D.

Beaty ("Dr. Beaty"), the

anesthesiologist who had assisted Dr. Gibb in the surgery, Xittrium
Laboratories and Baxter Healthcare, the manufacturer and distributor
of Exidine, an antimicrobial solution.

(R. 261-67.)

Essentially,

Mrs. Brady claimed that one or more of the defendants was negligent
in permitting an allegedly harmful solution to come in contact with
her eye and cause damage to the cornea.

2

(Id.)

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
The jury trial of this case began on September 22, 1992, in

Price, Utah.

(See Transcript of Jury Trial, hereinafter, "T. . " ) '

The trial was presided over by the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Seventh
District Judge.
(T. 228.)

UP&L admitted liability for the automobile accident.

During the course of the trial, UP&L settled with Mr. and

Mrs. Brady.
(T. 979-81.)
At the close of Mrs. Brady's evidence, Judge Bunnell ruled
that res ipsa loquitur principles had "no place in this lawsuit."
(T. 1164-65.)

Judge Bunnell also granted a directed verdict in favor

of defendant Dr. Clisto Beaty.

(T. 1163-65.)

On October 1, 1992,

the jury rendered its verdict with respect to the remaining
defendants.

(T. 1541-45.)

The jury assessed fault in the following

percentages:
UP&L
Mountain View Hospital
Dr. Randal B. Gibb
Xittrium Laboratories
Baxter Healthcare Corporation
(T. 1544.)

0%
10%
3 0%
40%
20%

The jury awarded total damages in the amount of

$330,503.15.

(Id.)

'Because the district court clerk failed to paginate the trial
transcript with the rest of the record on appeal, references to the
trial transcript will be made by the using the letter "T, " as
opposed to use of the letter "R" when references are made to the
paginated portion of the record on appeal.
3

C.

TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION.
Following the trial, counsel for Dr. Gibb filed a

Motion for New Trial and/or Remittitur.

(R. 1578-80.)

Dr. Gibb

argued that prejudicial confusion was created by giving
Instruction No. 20 along with Instruction Nos. 8, 18 and 19.
(R. 1581-1589.)

Dr. Gibb also argued that Dr. Barry Cook was

permitted to testify improperly in that he was not qualified to
render medical opinions, he was an improper rebuttal witness, and
his testimony constituted prejudicial surprise.

(R. 1590-95.)

The trial court denied Dr. Gibb's Motion for New Trial and/or
Remittitur.

(R. 1796-99, 1800-08)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

On December 16, 1988, Mr. and Mrs. Brady were

injured in a collision with a UP&L truck driven by a UP&L
employee.

(T. 1-2.)
2.

Mrs. Brady suffered extensive injuries to the left

side of her face, including a deep laceration from her left
eyelid down through the lip and a fractured cheek bone.

(T.

884.)
3.

Mrs. Brady was taken to the Mountain View Hospital

Emergency Room in Payson, Utah.
4.

(T. 883.)

Because of the extensive nature of Mrs. Brady's

injuries to her face, Dr. Gibb was called in to treat Mrs. Brady.
(T. 883-84, 1188.)
5.

Dr. Gibb is a board-certified otolaryngologist

(ENT -- ears, nose and throat.)
4

6.

Dr. Gibb determined that Mrs. Brady required

emergency surgery.
7.

Dr. Beaty was the anesthesiologist for Mrs.

Brady's surgery.
8.

(T. 885.)

(T. 941.)

After administering anesthesia to Mrs. Brady,

Dr. Beaty placed Lacri-Lube (an ointment used to protect the eye)
into both of Mrs. Brady's eyes, and taped them shut with a
silk-type tape.
9.

(T. 926-27, 940, 948-50.)

After the Lacri-Lube and tape were in place,

Dr. Gibb cleaned the left side of Mrs. Brady's face with Exidine
and saline.
10.

(T. 910, 926-27, 953, 1194-98.)
Exidine is an antimicrobial solution with

chlorhexidine gluconate as its primary active ingredient.
(T. 553-54.)
11.

Dr. Gibb used Exidine to scrub the inside and

outside of Mrs. Brady's facial wound.

(T. 1194-95.)

12.

Dr. Gibb used only two or three ounces of Exidine.

13.

Dr. Gibb used approximately one liter of saline to

(T. 1196.)

irrigate Mrs. Brady's sinuses and to wash away the Exidine.
(T. 1196-97.)
14.

The Exidine somehow came into contact with Mrs.

Brady's right eye and caused damage to the cornea despite the
fact that both eyes were taped shut and packed with Lacri-Lube.
(T. 1196.)
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15.

Dr. Beaty watched Mrs. Brady's face to prevent

substances from approaching the right eye and did not observe any
substance cross the bridge of Mrs. Brady's nose and enter her
right eye.

(T. 954-55.)

16.

Following surgery, Mrs. Brady complained of

burning and tearing in her right eye.
17.

(T. 1063-64, 1201-04.)

In January 1989, Mrs. Brady received treatment for

her right eye from Dr. Dafler, a Price ophthalmologist.

(T. 680,

1065.)
18.

In March 1989, Dr. Dafler sent Mrs. Brady to be

examined and treated by Dr. Kevin Charlton at the University of
Utah Medical Center.
19.

(T. 1066.)

Dr. Charlton, a specialist in cornea transplant

surgery and diseases of the cornea, attributed Mrs. Brady's
condition to Fuch's Dystrophy, a natural degenerative disease of
the eye.

(T. 681.)
20.

On April 11, 1989, Dr. Charlton performed a cornea

transplant on Mrs. Brady.
21.

(T. 684.)

On April 14, 1989, Dr. Charlton informed

Dr. Dafler that he did not know the cause of Mrs. Brady's righteye vision problem.
22.

(T. 702.)

Dr. Charlton expressed interest in knowing whether

Fuch's Dystrophy was the cause of Mrs. Brady's vision problem.
(T. 702.)
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23.

On April 26, 1989, Dr. Charlton reported to

Dr. Dafler that he would "check to see what's in" Exidine.
(T. 703.)
24.

Dr. Frederick E. Fraunfelder ophthalmologist and a

national expert in toxic eye injuries, performed extensive
experiments on Lacri-Lube, the silk-like tape, and Mrs. Brady's
eye tissue to determine whether Exidine could have caused the
damage to Mrs. Brady's cornea.
25.

(T. 552-58, 621-26.)

On May 10, 19 89, Dr. Charlton informed Dr. Dafler

that he was satisfied with Dr. Fraunfelder's conclusion that
Exidine had damaged Mrs. Brady's eye.
26.

On July 26, 1990, Mr. and Mrs. Brady sued UP&L for

injuries sustained in the collision.
27.

(T. 703-04.)

(T. 1-3.)

On September 4, 1990, UP&L filed a Third-Party

Complaint against Mountain View Hospital and Dr. Gibb. (T. 5865.)
28.

At trial, Mrs. Brady attempted to establish that

Exidine was a toxic solution and that it should never have been
used during the surgery.
29.

(Passim.)

Mrs. Brady introduced evidence that established

her visual acuity in the right eye as 20/30 and that established
chronic dryness and a lack of tearing in the eye.

(T. 1071-72,

1074-76, 1084-85.)
30.

In 1987, Stuart Pharmaceuticals mailed a "Dear

Doctor" letter to designated physicians, informing them about
possible dangers from use of the product, Hibiclens, which, like
7

Exidine, is a brand-name antimicrobial solution containing
chlorhexidine gluconate.
31.

(T. 995-97, 1005-11, 1013-14.)

Several expert witnesses, including ENT physicians

and ophthalmologists, testified they did not remember receiving
or did not receive the Hibiclens "Dear Doctor" letter.

(T. 706,

619-20, 1257, 159-60.)
32.

In 1987, an article was published in the Journal

of Ophthalmology which stated that Hibiclens was toxic to the
eye.

(T. 554-55.)
33.

Dr. G. Marsden Blanch, an otolaryngologist from

Salt Lake City, Utah, testified that at the time in question, he
was never made aware of the Journal of Ophthalmology article or
any other literature addressing the dangers of chlorhexidine
gluconate.

(T. 1259-60.)
34.

At trial, Dr. Fraunfelder rendered opinions about

labelling defects, the use of Exidine as a pre-operative
cleanser, and the use of chlorhexidine gluconate around the eye.
(T. 545-47, 552, 562, 594, 596-97, 602-04, 645.)
35.

As a result of Dr. Fraunfelder's testing and

experiments for this case, he designed a new eye patch which was
designed to keep solutions out of the eye during surgery.
(T. 625-26.)
36.

Mrs. Brady called Dr. Mark S. Granick, an

otolaryngologist and plastic surgeon from Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, to testify concerning the standard of care for
Dr. Gibb.

(T. 735, 43-44.)
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37.

Dr. Gibb called Dr. G. Marsden Blanch, an

otolaryngologist from Salt Lake City, Utah, to testify concerning
Dr. Gibbs' care.
38.

(T. 1265.)

Dr. Gibb testified in support of his own care.

(T. 1207-09.)
39.

Xittrium called Dr. Randal Olsen, who testified by

way of deposition about the standard of care for otolaryngologist
in protecting against damage to the eye.
40.

Mrs. Brady also offered opinions of Dr. Olsen in

support of her claims against Dr. Gibb.
41.

(T. 1329.)

(T. 1323-24.)

For the first time in the case, Mrs. Brady

testified at trial that she suffered from a peripheral vision
problem.

(T. 1071, 1086-87, 1368-70.)
42.

During her deposition on July 26, 1992, some two

months before trial, Mrs. Brady made no mention of any peripheral
vision problem in her right eye.

(Excerpts from Marjorie Brady

Deposition, pp. 50, 54, 56, 75, 77-78, 94, attached at
Addendum 4.)
43.

None of the defendants presented any evidence

which directly controverted Mrs. Brady's claim that she suffered
from a peripheral vision problem.
44.

During the last afternoon of trial, the trial

court permitted Dr. Barry Cook to testify as a rebuttal witness
for Mrs. Brady.

(T. 1371-91.)
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45.

The trial court also permitted Mrs. Brady to

testify a second time concerning the alleged peripheral vision
problem.

(T. 1368-71.)
46.

Dr. Cook is a Price optometrist who saw Mrs. Brady

for the first time in many years during the lunch hour on the day
of his testimony.
47.
local counsel.
48.

(T. 1388-90.)

Mrs. Brady's visit to Dr. Cook was arranged by her
(Id.)
Over the objection of counsel for Dr. Gibb, Dr.

Cook was permitted to testify that the vision in Mrs. Brady's
right eye was 20/60 and that she suffered from a significant
peripheral vision deficit.
49.

(T. 1372-87.)

Mrs. Brady's own treating ophthalmologist had

earlier testified that, six days before trial, Mrs. Brady's
visual acuity was 20/30 in both eyes.
50.

(T. 693, 700.)

Mrs. Brady's treating ophthalmologist testified

that Mrs. Brady had good functional vision and made no mention of
a peripheral vision problem.
51.

(Id.)

Dr. Cook had not been identified as a witness by

counsel for Mrs. Brady, despite interrogatories seeking that
information and despite a pretrial order requiring the
designation of witnesses.
52.

(T. 1101-03.)

In closing argument, the emphasis of

Mr. Humpherys' argument on damages was Mrs. Brady's alleged
peripheral vision problem.

(T. 1474-76, 1535-36.)

10

53.

At the close of the evidence, the trial court

dismissed Mrs. Brady's res ipsa loquitur claim.
54.

(T. 1164-65.)

Over the objection of counsel for Dr. Gibb, the

trial court gave Instruction No. 20, the "common knowledge
exception" instruction.
55.

(T. 1414-15, Addendum 2.)

In addition to the "common knowledge exception"

instruction, the trial court also submitted two separate
instructions which required the jury to decide the case solely on
the basis of expert testimony.

(T. 1421-22, 1425-26,

Addendum 3.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error by giving a
"common knowledge exception" jury instruction.

The nature of

this case is such that lay persons do not possess the common
knowledge, experience and understanding required to assess
standards of care and alleged breaches of those standards.

It

was also error for the trial court to give a "common knowledge
exception" jury instruction, in conjunction with several
instructions mandating that the jury must rely upon expert
testimony to evaluate the standard of care for Dr. Gibb.

The

submission of conflicting jury instructions created
irreconcilable confusion for the jury and resulted in substantial
prejudice to Dr. Gibb.
The trial court also erred by permitting Dr. Barry Cook
to testify as a rebuttal witness at trial. Dr. Cook did not
rebut any evidence of defendants, but was used only to bolster
11

Mrs. Brady's damages' claim.

It was also error to allow Dr. Cook

to testify because he was not a qualified expert to render
medical opinions about Mrs. Brady's condition.
The surprise use of Dr. Cook prejudiced Dr. Gibb by
denying him an opportunity to evaluate Dr. Cook's credentials,
examine his methods and assess his true qualifications as an
expert witness.

Even had counsel for Dr. Gibb not objected, it

was plain error to allow Dr. Cook to testify and to admit into
evidence Exhibits 64 and 65, the "visual field" test results.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 20, THE
"COMMON KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION" INSTRUCTION.
In submitting the case to the jury, the trial court
allowed Instruction No. 20 to be given over the objection of
counsel for Dr. Gibb.

(T. 1414.)

Instruction No. 20 reads as

follows:
Expert testimony is unnecessary to establish
the standard of care owed to the plaintiff by
defendant Dr. Randall B. Gibb and Mountain
View Hospital in a medical malpractice case
where the medical procedure is of a kind or
the outcome so offends commonly held notions
of medical propriety, that the standards of
care can be established by the common
knowledge, experience and understanding of a
layman.
(T. 1426, Addendum 2.)

Judge Bunnell's reason for giving

Instruction No. 20 is reflected in the Order Re: Post-Trial
Motions ("the Order"):
12

With respect to the question of conflicting
jury instructions, the court finds that a
common knowledge exception to the requirement
for expert testimony exists. The common
knowledge exception applied to establishing
the duty of care in this case. The common
knowledge exception would also apply and, at
the same time, expert testimony was required
to establish whether or not there was a duty
of care and whether or not there was a breach
of that duty.
(R. 1805.)
Dr. Gibb maintains that Judge Bunnell incorrectly
believed that the common knowledge, experience and understanding
of a layman would permit the jurors to be familiar with the
various standards or duties of care that were alleged to apply to
Dr. Gibb.
A.
THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE EXCEPTION
DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.
Based upon the language of the Order, Judge Bunnell
apparently found "standard of care" and "duty of care" to be
synonymous.

"Duty of care" is defined as follows:

The duty of care generally owed by a
physician to his patient is to exercise that
degree of skill and learning ordinarily
possessed and exercised, under similar
circumstances, by other practitioners in his
field of practice. He must use ordinary
(ordinary for a physician) and reasonable
care and diligence, and his best judgment, in
applying his skill to his patient's case.
Farrow v. Health Serv. Corp., 604 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1979).

In

this case, Mrs. Brady alleged that Dr. Gibb owed her essentially
three different duties of care.

Each duty must be examined to

demonstrate that none of the alleged duties was within the common
13

knowledge, experience and understanding of the layman.
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980).

See

The best

illustration of the alleged duties of care is found in the
testimony of Mrs. Brady's primary expert witness.
Counsel for Mrs. Brady called Dr. Mark S. Granick, an
otolaryngologist and plastic surgeon from Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, as an expert witness. Mr. Humpherys directed the
focus of his examination into three alleged standards of care
that, it was claimed, Dr. Gibb had breached:
Q.

Doctor, I have requested that you
address the actions of Dr. Gibb in three
areas. One, did he breach the standard
of care regarding staying current on the
use of his primary drugs and
pharmaceutical solutions? I think
you've answered that.

A.

Yes.

Q.

The second question I wanted you to
address is where he used it; that is, on
the face of Mrs. Brady in that location.
Was that a breach of his standard of
care?

A.

Yes. This agent specifically should be
not used on the face.

Q.

Why?

A.

Because of potential hazards to both the
eyes and the ears.

Q.

Now, third, I've asked you to address
the area of how he used it during the
surgical procedure. Do you have an
opinion, based upon how he used it,
whether he breached his standard of care
as an operating physician?

(T. 743-744, emphasis added.)

According to Dr. Granick, Dr. Gibb

had the duty to (1) "stay current" on the use of pharmaceutical
14

solutions, (2) avoid the use of Exidine on the face, and
(3) avoid the use of "copious" amounts of Exidine as a solution
to wash the face.

(T. 743-45.)

When all is said and done,

Mrs. Brady's claim concerning the standard of care for Dr. Gibb
in this case is simply stated:

Dr. Gibb should not have used

Exidine on Mrs. Brady's face.
In order for the common knowledge exception to apply,
it must be shown that the lay person, based upon his or her own
common knowledge, experience and understanding and without the
aid of expert testimony, knows that Dr. Gibb should not have used
chlorhexidine gluconate on Mrs. Brady's face. Dr. Gibb did not
use hydrochloric acid on Mrs. Brady's face.

If he had, the

common knowledge exception might be appropriate.

Since the lay

person does not even know what chlorhexidine gluconate is, much
less whether Exidine contains chlorhexidine gluconate and whether
it is potentially toxic to the eye, the common knowledge
exception is not applicable and the giving of Instruction No. 20
constituted reversible error.
The origin of the common knowledge exception in Utah is
generally traced to the Supreme Court of Utah decision in
Fredrickson v. Maw. 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951).

In

Fredrickson. the plaintiff claimed that the defendant physician
was negligent in leaving gauze and threads in the tonsil cavity
following a tonsillectomy.

In affirming a judgment for the

plaintiff based upon evidence that did not include expert
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testimony, the Supreme Court quoted with favor from Wharton v.
Warner, 135 P. 235 (Wash. 1913):
The reason is that in most cases a layman can
have no knowledge whether the proper medicine
was administered or the proper surgical
treatment given. Whether a surgical
operation was unskillfully or skillfully
performed is a scientific question. If
however a surgeon should lose the instrument
with which he operates in the incision in
which he makes in his patient, it would seem
as a matter of common sense that scientific
opinion could throw a little light on the
subject.
227 P.2d at 773 (emphasis added).
the 1959 decision in
1108 (1959).

Fredrickson was followed by

Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d

In Marsh. the plaintiff alleged that the defendant

was negligent in casting his foot following a procedure known as
a "triple arthrodesis."

The Utah Supreme Court rejected the

plaintiff's argument that the case fell within the common
knowledge exception.

The Court expressly noted that it was

certainly not within the common knowledge of the layman as to how
tight a cast should be applied following a triple arthrodesis.
The Court stated:
In the absence of a standard of care
established by expert medical testimony and
some evidence showing a deviation from the
standard, it must be presumed that the
physician skillfully operated on and treated
the plaintiff. To allow the question of
negligence to be submitted to the jury
without first establishing the standard of
care would allow a jury to indulge in a type
of speculation not generally allowed.

To submit the question of liability to the
jury under such circumstances would be to
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base a verdict upon a mere possibility of
negligence. It is seldom that a doctor's
standard of care, because it is so
specialized, is known or is within the
knowledge of a layman.
347 P.2d at 1111 (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court again discussed the
applicability of the common knowledge exception in Kim v.
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980).

In Kim, a dentist dropped a

drill bit down the plaintiff's throat during the course of a root
canal operation.

The trial court granted the defendant dentist's

motion for directed verdict on the basis that the plaintiff had
failed to establish the appropriate standard of care through
expert testimony.

In reversing the trial court, the Court

stated:
When the impropriety of treatment complained
of is of such a nature that lay person could
judge from common knowledge and experience
that such an injury would not happen if there
had been proper skill and care, expert
testimony is not necessary. Examples of this
exception are where medical supplies or
treatment are left in the patient. The loss
of the drill bit down the plaintiff's throat
fits within the pattern of those cases.
610 P.2d at 1271.
The decision in Kim was followed by the oft-cited
decision in Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980).

In

Nixdorf, the defendant physician lost a curved cutting needle
during the course of performing a hysterectomy.

The physician

made the conscious decision to leave the needle in the operating
site after unsuccessful attempts to locate and recover the
needle.

A majority of the Supreme Court noted:
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However, this Court has recognized certain
exceptions to the general rule requiring
expert testimony. Specifically, expert
testimony is unnecessary to establish a
standard of care owed the plaintiff where the
propriety of the treatment received is within
the common knowledge and experience of the
layman. The loss of a surgical instrument or
other paraphernalia, in the operating site,
exemplifies this type of treatment.
(Id. at 352.)2
Based upon the evolution of Utah case law from
Fredrickson through Nixdorf. it is apparent that the common
knowledge exception is a very narrow exception indeed.

It is

applicable only in the rarest of cases where the standard of care
for the physician is obvious.

This is not such a case.

The case

against Dr. Gibb really turned on what Dr. Gibb knew about
Exidine and chlorhexidine gluconate and when he should have
acquired that knowledge.

The testimony of Dr. Olsen, offered as

an expert against Dr. Gibb by both Xittrium and Mrs. Brady,
illustrates the difficulty that even a highly trained
ophthalmologist was having with the issue of when the standard of
care required Dr. Gibb to acquire knowledge about Exidine:

Interestingly, Justice Stewart dissented and noted that not even a "foreign object in the body" case was
an obvious candidate for the common knowledge exception:
I recognize that there is a ring of common sense to the proposition
that leaving foreign objects in a person constitutes negligence, see
Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951), but
neither justice nor common sense are enhanced by the mechanistic
application of a rule of law to a fact situation that is only
superficially related to the type of situation the rule was intended to
govern. In this case, I cannot see how a jury could possibly find
negligence in light of Dr. Hicken's testimony and in the absence of
any contrary expert testimony. I think the trial judge was right in
directing a verdict on this issue. 612 P. 2d at 357.
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Q.

Dr. Olsen, is it your testimony that it
was Dr. Gibb's responsibility to not use
the Exidine solution that was presented
for his use in the surgery of Mrs. Brady
in December of 1988?

A.

My testimony is that a prudent person at that time
could have used it about the face but with care
and attention to make sure that it didn't get into
the eye and in particular at that time, that it
was a significant concern and would have been
disseminated through that period of time.
Certainly, and as I pointed out, in these legal
events we unfortunately like to talk about the
perfect world, and the real world is different.
There's a dissemination curve. It's a real fact.
At what point should that have been
general knowledge? At the time of the
"Dear Doctor" letter, late 1987, I think
general information should have been
available; certainly by late 1988.
Using it -- I think more and more
people would not have been using it
about the head and face, but I think to
be very careful about the eye. And
there are ways of prepping in which you
are very careful about the eye. Copious
irrigation, liberal use, is a way that
would be hard to prevent keeping it out
of the eye. So I feel that using it was
not necessarily at that point a problem.
I think today it probably would be. But
I think that how it was used was
probably a problem.

(T. 1352-53, emphasis added.)
Dr. Gibb used Exidine on Mrs. Brady's face in December
of 1988. The evidence at trial established that the information
concerning the potential harmful effects of chlorhexidine
gluconate appeared only in the ophthalmology literature and not
in the ENT literature that Dr. Gibb would be expected to read.
(Testimony of Dr. Fraunfelder, T. 631.)

Even Dr. Olsen --

someone who, as an ophthalmologist, would be attuned to and
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expected to read ophthalmology literature -- had a difficult time
saying when the standard of care would have required Dr. Gibb to
know that Exidine was potentially harmful to the eye.

If someone

like Dr. Olsen has such difficulty, it simply cannot be
reasonably argued that the standard of care is common knowledge.
Based upon the testimony of Dr. Olsen -- a witness
whose opinions were offered in evidence by Mrs. Brady herself -two of the three duties argued by Mrs. Brady's other expert
witness, Dr. Granick, are eliminated.

The remaining standard is

Dr. Gibb's alleged duty to avoid the use of "copious" amounts of
Exidine on Mrs. Brady's face. A layman does not possess the
common knowledge, experience and understanding to determine
Dr. Gibb's duty in that regard.

See, Fredrickson, supra

("Whether a surgical operation was unskillfully or skillfully
performed is a scientific question.").

The determination of

whether Dr. Gibb skillfully used Exidine on Mrs. Brady's face
required expert testimony and was not susceptible of resolution
with common knowledge.
One point that should not be overlooked is the
fundamental notion of the injury itself.

This case is unlike the

other common knowledge cases in which the nature of the injury
itself is so obvious as to be commonly understood to be a product
of negligence.

In this case, the nature of the injury and how it

occurred was not known for many months after the December 19 88
surgery.

As late as April of 19 89, Dr. Kevin Charlton,

Mrs. Brady's treating ophthalmologist, suspected that the injury
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might have been due to Fuch's Dystrophy.

(T. 681.)

It was only

after Dr. Charlton enlisted the help of Dr. Fraunfelder that
extensive experiments were conducted to determine how the Exidine
might have entered the "off" eye despite the fact that the eye
was closed, packed with Lacri-Lube and patched.

If the nature of

the injury was an initial mystery to the physicians involved, it
can hardly be said that the injury itself suggested obvious
negligence.
POINT II
WHEN GIVEN AFTER INSTRUCTION NO. 18 AND
INSTRUCTION NO. 19f INSTRUCTION NO. 2 0 CREATED
PREJUDICIAL CONFUSION IN THE MINDS OF THE JURORS.
Judge Bunnell gave three instructions which addressed
the standard of care for Dr. Gibb.

The first was Instruction

No. 18:
In deciding whether a physician properly
fulfilled his or her duties, you are not
permitted to use a standard derived from your
own experience with physicians nor any other
standard of your own. A physician is
required to exercise the same degree of
learning, care, skill and treatment
ordinarily possessed and used by other
qualified physicians in good standing
practicing in the same medical field. The
law does not require that a physician
exercise the highest degree of care. It
requires the physician to exercise the degree
of care that other qualified physicians would
ordinarily exercise under the same
circumstances.
(T. 1425-26, Addendum 3.)

Instruction No. 19 followed:

The only way you may properly learn the
applicable standard of care and determine
whether or not the defendant physicians
conformed to it is through evidence presented
during this trial by individuals testifying
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as expert witnesses who knew of that standard
as it existed at that time, and by other
evidence admitted for the purpose of defining
the standard of care.
(Id.)

On the heels of those two instructions which both

admonished the jury that they were not permitted to define the
standard of care from their own experience, Judge Bunnell gave
Instruction No. 20:
Expert testimony is unnecessary to establish
the standard of care owed to the plaintiff by
defendant Dr. Randall B. Gibb and Mountain
View Hospital in a medical malpractice case
where the medical procedure is of a kind, or
the outcome so offends commonly held notions
of medical propriety, that the standards of
care can be established by the common
knowledge, experience and understanding of a
layman.
(Id.)
Thus, after twice instructing the jury that expert
testimony was necessary to establish the standard of care for
Dr. Gibb, Judge Bunnell created irreconcilable confusion by
instructing the jury that expert testimony was unnecessary.
Judge Bunnell attempted to explain his reasoning in his
Order.

(R. 1800-08, Addendum 1.)

Judge Bunnell's explanations

are almost as confusing as the three jury instructions
themselves.

Interestingly, Judge Bunnell fails to refer to

Instruction No. 19 altogether.

(R. 800-06.)

Instruction No. 19

and Instruction No. 20 are in direct conflict with each other.
Obviously, Instruction No. 20 was given immediately after
Instruction No. 19.

In omitting any reference whatsoever to

Instruction No. 19, Judge Bunnell demonstrated that he failed to
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appreciate the confusion that was created by the two inconsistent
instructions.

Judge Bunnell states:

The common knowledge exception applied to
establish the duty of care in this case. The
common knowledge exception would also apply
and, at the same time, expert testimony was
required to establish whether or not there
was a duty of care and whether or not there
was a breach of that duty.
(R. 1805, Addendum 1.)

These two sentences cannot be reconciled

with each other any more than Instruction Nos. 18, 19 and 20 can
be.

How can the common knowledge exception apply to

"establishing the duty of care," while at the same time expert
testimony was required to establish whether or not that duty of
care existed?

Judge Bunnell goes on to state:

Instruction No. 18 and Instruction No. 20
were given in an attempt to answer both the
rulings of the Utah Supreme Court in this
area. The Court notes that both Instruction
No. 18 and Instruction No. 20 are in the
Proposed Uniform Jury Instructions without
any explanation except the citations to the
cases from which they come. Both
instructions are recognized and it is an
extremely close call as to whether or not the
jury would be misled by giving both
instructions.
(R. 1805, Addendum 1.)

There are many instructions in the Model

Utah Jury instructions ("MUJI"), many of which are in direct
conflict with other instructions.

It is the responsibility of

the trial judge to decide which instructions are applicable in
each particular case.

Jury Instructions are not given simply

because they appear in MUJI.

The trial judge must evaluate the

evidence that has been presented in the case and determine which
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instructions are proper and which are not.

In this case, Judge

Bunnell improperly left that determination to the jury.
Judge Bunnell goes on to attempt to justify his error
by explaining that there was sufficient expert testimony in the
case with respect to the standard of care for Dr. Gibb.
Bunnell's explanation misses the point.

Judge

The jury, faced with the

irreconcilable confusion created by Instructions Nos. 18, 19, and
20, could easily ignore all the expert testimony and decide the
case based upon the common knowledge exception set forth in
Instruction No. 20.

For the reasons stated in Point I A. above,

the common knowledge exception has no place in this case. While
there was expert testimony offered against Dr. Gibb, even the
adverse experts conceded points to Dr. Gibb and, at the very
least, equivocated in their testimony.

Dr. Fraunfelder,

acknowledged to be the nation's leading expert in his field,
supported Dr. Gibb's defense in a number of areas.

For example,

Dr. Fraunfelder testified:
•

In the "real world" whether a physician
should know that Exidine and Hibiclens
had the same active ingredients would be
"shades of gray." (T. 603.)

•

In the "real world" in 19 88, physicians
were using Exidine as a pre-operative
scrub solution, wound cleaner and skin
prep. (T. 614, 632.)

•

It would not be fair to require a doctor
to make the correlation that Exidine and
Hibiclens were exactly the same product.
(T. 637-38.)

•

The majority of physicians could not
tell what the active ingredients and
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chemicals were in the solutions they
were using. (T. 638.)
•

The original warning label on Exidine
was not explicit enough to inform
doctors of the hazards of allowing
Exidine to migrate into a patient's eye.
(T. 639.)

•

Even after
explaining
gluconate,
precaution

•

He did not know the difference between a scrub
solution and a pre-operative surgical scrub
solution, just as he was sure that Dr. Gibb did
not know the difference. (T. 667.)

reading the ophthalmology article
the potential risk of chlorhexidine
he would consider using it with extreme
to keep it out of the eye. (T. 656.)

In addition to establishing these and other concessions on
cross-examination from adverse experts, Dr. Gibb also offered
expert testimony of his own in support of his care.

The effect

of allowing the case to go to the jury with Instruction No. 20
was to permit the jury to avoid the required exercise of deciding
the case based upon expert testimony.

The jury was allowed to

improperly decide the case without scrutinizing and evaluating
evidence from the expert witnesses.

If the jury had been

required to weigh the expert testimony and decide the case in
that manner, it is submitted that the result would have been far
different.
In Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp.. 830 P.2d 270 (Utah
1992), the Utah Supreme Court dealt with remarkably similar jury
instructions in a medical malpractice case.

In Nielsen, the

plaintiff claimed that Dr. Dickson, the anesthesiologist, was
responsible for damage to dental work that she suffered during
knee surgery.

The plaintiff asserted both theories of res ipsa
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loquitur and common law negligence against Dr. Dickson.

In

submitting the case to the jury, the trial judge gave conflicting
jury instructions.

The common knowledge exception was combined

with a res ipsa loquitur instruction in Nielsen and was given as
Instruction No. 22:
The Court instructs you that in certain
situations it is not necessary for the
plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to
present evidence of the defendants'
negligence by expert testimony. Specifically, where the propriety of the treatment
received is within the common knowledge and
experience of the layman, expert testimony is
unnecessary to establish the standard of care
owed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff must,
however, establish by the evidence that:
1.
The accident was of a kind which,
in the ordinary course of events, would not
have happened had the defendant(s) used due
care ;
2.
The instrument or thing causing the
injury was at the time of the accident under
the management and control of the
defendant(s); and
3.
The accident happened irrespective
of any participation at the time by the
plaintiff.
If you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that all three of the above criteria
have been met, then you may find an inference
of negligence from those circumstances. This
does not mean that negligence is necessarily
established, it merely creates an inference
which may be rebutted by the defendant or
defendants.
830 P.2d at 272-73.

The common knowledge portion of the first

paragraph of Instruction No. 22 in Nielsen is essentially the
same as Instruction No. 20 in this case.

(See Addendum 2.)

Certainly, the message to the jury is the same.
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In Nielsen, the

trial court also gave Instruction No. 19, which is essentially
the same as Instruction No. 18 combined with Instruction No. 19
in this case.

(See Addendum 3.)

In discussing the conflict between the Nixdorf
instructions, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Instruction 19 is even more misleading, in
sum, it prohibits the jury from using a
professional standard of care derived from
the jurors' own experience and requires them
to rely only upon expert testimony in
determining the standard. This is the exact
opposite of what the common knowledge
exception permits, which is the basis for the
res ipsa loquitur theory.

In the instant case, Instruction 22 informed
the jury about the common knowledge exception
and stated that expert testimony is not
always needed to determine the standard of
care. However, Instruction 19, which stated
that expert testimony is the only way to
ascertain the standard of care, directly
contradicted Instruction 22.
83 0 P.2d at 2 74.

The Supreme Court went on to find that the

instructions were prejudicially confusing to the jury.
In the instant case, the potential for confusion is
even greater than in Nielsen.

In Nielsen, it could at least be

argued -- and it was -- that one instruction (Instruction 19)
went to the common knowledge negligence theory, and the common
knowledge exception instruction (Instruction 22) went to the res
ipsa loquitur theory.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument,

noting that the jury could not expected to sort out the
confusion.

In this case, Mrs. Brady's alternative theory of res

ipsa loquitur was eliminated by Judge Bunnell at the close of the
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plaintiff's evidence.

(T. 1164-65.)

Therefore, the case went to

the jury on the single theory of common law negligence.
Unfortunately, it went to the jury on that theory with two
differing and conflicting standards.

The resulting confusion

could not be reconciled by the jury and constitutes prejudicial
and reversible error.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
DR. BARRY COOK TO TESTIFY.
Dr. Barry Cook is a Price optometrist who was permitted
to testify as a rebuttal witness during the afternoon of the last
day of trial.

(T. 1371-91.)

His testimony was arranged by

Mrs. Brady's attorneys only hours before Dr. Cook actually
testified:
Q.

When was the first time that you saw
this lady between this day as you sit
here in Court and September 1 of this
year?

A.

I think I already testified that I saw
her today. That's the first time I've
seen her for many, many years.

Q.

When is the first time that you met her
attorney, Mr. Humpherys?

A.

About ten minutes ago right outside
here.

Q.

You don't have any medical records on
her with regard to any complaints or
problems associated with vision, do you?

A.

No.

Q.

Now, sir, you have not had her come to
you and indicate that she has any
peripheral problems in her vision; is
that true?
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A.

Only with what she's been to me today.

Q.

Who brought her to you today?

A.

Keith Chiara, and she and her husband
came into my office, yes.

Q.

Her attorney brought her over to your
office today, right?

A.

Keith called this morning and asked if
there was any way that I could render
some help, and I said, "Fine. Let's do
my lunch hour."

(T. 1388-89, emphasis added.)

Dr. Cook was permitted to testify

that Mrs. Brady had 20/20 vision in her left eye, 20/60 vision in
her right eye, and that she suffered from a peripheral vision
defect in the right eye.

(T. 1386.)

Dr. Cook himself conceded

the weakness of his testimony:
Q.

Now, regarding your opinion that
Mrs. Brady's cornea impairs her
vision -- her peripheral vision -- could
you now explain how you reached that
conclusion?

A.

Judging from what I just read over the
lunch hour and over just this
afternoon -- I didn't get a chance to
really study as much as I would like
to - - but I feel that part of her vision
loss is due to the cornea, yes.

(T. 1386.)

Despite the fact that it was apparent that Dr. Cook

was ill-prepared to testify and despite the fact that
circumstances made it clear that Dr. Gibb could not have
anticipated his testimony, Judge Bunnell permitted Dr. Cook to
testify.

Judge Bunnell's thinking is reflected in the Order:
The court finds that the issue with respect
to the admissibility of the testimony of
Dr. Barry Cook and the admissibility of
Exhibits 64 and 65 are very close calls.
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However, the court finds that Dr. Cook's
testimony was proper rebuttal concerning
evidence relative to the condition of
Mrs. Brady's eye after the injury and the way
the eye had recovered. With respect to the
issue of Dr. Cook's credibility as a local
witness, the court finds that the claim made
against Dr. Cook was written up in the papers
and received notoriety in the community. The
issue of the credibility of the witness is
for the jury to take into account with the
guidance of jury instructions on credibility
of witnesses. The court further finds that
it is a close call as to whether or not
Dr. Cook's testimony and Exhibits 64 and 65
constituted surprise. However, the court
concludes that a new trial is not warranted
on that basis because the evidence was proper
rebuttal to the denial of the amount of
damage.
(R. 1804, Addendum 1.)
A.
DR. COOK WAS NOT A PROPER REBUTTAL WITNESS
In Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant
Gibb's Motion for New Trial and/or Remittitur, Mrs. Brady argues
that Dr. Cook was called to rebut the testimony of Dr. Olsen.
(R. 1626-2 7.) Mrs. Brady argued:
During trial, defendants Xittrium, Baxter and
Mountain View Hospital read the deposition of
Dr. Randall Olsen, who testified that, in his
opinion, Mrs. Brady had no residual permanent
effects from her eye injury. When the
defendants rested, Mrs. Brady called herself
and Dr. Barry Cook, who testified concerning
deficits in Mrs. Brady's peripheral
vision. . . Here, Dr. Cook's testimony
directly refuted that given by Dr. Olsen and,
hence, was rebuttal testimony.
(Id. citations omitted.)

A review of the testimony at trial

demonstrates that Dr. Cook was not a proper rebuttal witness and
that his testimony was highly prejudicial.
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In her case-in-chief, Mrs. Brady called Dr. Kevin
Charlton, the ophthalmologist who performed several surgeries and
the person who had been her treating ophthalmologist for over
three years.

Dr. Charlton had performed successful cataract

surgery on Mrs. Brady on September 9, 1992, and had examined her
on September 16, 1992, only six days before the trial began.
Dr. Charlton testified:

(T. 693.)

Q.

What is her current visual acuity;
meaning her current ability to see with
glasses on?

A.

Okay. On my last examination, which was
September 16th of '92, her vision with
her glasses was a 20/30.

Q.

That's pretty good success?

A.

Yes, that's very good.

Q.

Now, is that as good as she would have
had, but for this Exidine incident, if
you know?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

Okay. I guess we can ask her. At this
time, doctor, is there anything further
that you can see that needs to be done
or could be done to improve her vision?

A.

No.

The record of Dr. Charlton's September 16, 1992

examination was introduced into evidence.

Dr. Charlton went on

to explain that her visual acuity was 20/30 in both eyes,
indicating that the acuity was the same in the eye that had not
been affected by Exidine.

(T. 700.)

Dr. Charlton testified that

she had "good functional vision, and she should be able to drive
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and go about her daily tasks quite well."

(T. 712.)

Dr. Charlton did not mention any problem with peripheral vision
whatsoever.

To the contrary, he testified that Mrs. Brady had

20/30 acuity in both eyes and had good functional vision.
Despite the opportunity to do so, Mr. Humpherys did not ask his
own witness -- the one person who was eminently qualified to
address the issue -- any questions concerning peripheral vision.
During the direct examination of Mrs. Brady,
Mr. Humpherys brought up the subject of peripheral vision for the
first time.

(T. 1071.)

Mr. Humpherys then proceeded to conduct

a demonstration in the courtroom to supposedly demonstrate that
Mrs. Brady suffered from problems with her peripheral vision.
(T. 1071-72.)

Mrs. Brady went so far as to testify that the

alleged peripheral vision problem caused her to be afraid of
falling down when walking down an incline or stepping down a
step.

(T. 1072.)

all defendants.

This testimony came as a complete surprise to
(See Marjorie Brady Deposition exerpts,

Addendum 4.)
Xittrium then called Dr. Olsen to testify.

Dr. Olsen

was retained by Xittrium as an expert witness to testify against
Dr. Gibb on the standard of care.

Because Dr. Olsen was arguably

critical of Dr. Gibb, Mr. Humpherys also offered Dr. Olsen as an
expert witness.

Mr. Humpherys' purpose in calling Dr. Olsen is

illustrated in the following representation to Judge Bunnell:
MR. HUMPHERYS: Thank you. There are going
to be two areas he's (Dr. Olsen) going to
address, Your Honor. He's going to address
the fact that the use of copious amounts of
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the Exidine in or around the eye is a breach
of the standard of care and that the
surgeons, during this period of time, were
using it very carefully, if they used it at
all, on the face.
Second, he's going to be talking about the
common knowledge of Exidine - - or I should
say chlorhexidine gluconate and how it was
widely known --in fact, he was going to be
publishing articles on it and prepared
articles for it. And it was widely discussed
in all of the circles in his organizations
and specialties.
Finally, in some of the areas where Gary
Stott did not read, there is - - this is where
he specifically talks about the preparation
of an area using a surgical scrub such as
Exidine and how he is familiar with that.
And I would like to have that read, unless
the Court has already seen sufficient
foundation. I don't want to waste any
additional time. If the Court wants to read
additional, I will have Mr. Jones read some
additional areas.
(T. 1323-24.)

Rather than being a witness whose testimony gave

rise to a need for rebuttal testimony, Mr. Humpherys'
representations to the Court made it clear that Dr. Olsen was
Mrs. Brady's own witness.
Because Dr. Olsen was not present at trial, his entire
testimony was read from his deposition of September 14, 1992.
During the direct examination by Mr. Sampson, Dr. Olsen rendered
opinions that were critical of Dr. Gibb.

At the very end of his

examination, he touched briefly on Mrs. Brady's current
condition:
But even at her present level, she certainly
has had a good result and has an eye with
good function. And that appears that she has
an excellent prognosis and she'll maintain
that.
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(T. 1336.)

Mr. Humpherys then followed with a number of

questions that were directed solely toward eliciting opinions
that were critical of Dr. Gibb.

(T. 1336-40.)

In the

fifty-three pages that comprise the testimony of Dr. Olsen in the
trial transcript (T. 1306-59), the only reference to Mrs. Brady's
current condition is found in the five lines quoted above.
Dr. Olsen never mentioned peripheral vision.

He did not offer

any testimony that could reasonably be viewed as countering
Mrs. Brady's surprise testimony about peripheral vision.
Dr. Olsen was an expert witness who was offered by Xittrium and
Mrs. Brady herself to be critical of Dr. Gibb and his testimony
did not provide a proper reason for bringing Dr. Barry Cook in to
testify at the eleventh hour.
Defendants presented their entire cases without even
mentioning a possible deficit in the peripheral vision of
Mrs. Brady's right eye.

On rebuttal, Mrs. Brady was then

permitted to take the stand a second time and reiterate her prior
testimony, mentioned for the first time at trial, about a
peripheral vision deficit.

(T. 1368-70.)

Immediately following

Mrs. Brady's testimony, Dr. Barry Cook was called by
Mr. Humpherys.

The following exchange took place:

MR. HUMPHERYS: Your Honor, we have one final
witness, Dr. Barry Cook, an optometrist here
locally in Price.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. HUMPHERYS: If I could, Your Honor, since
I've not had the chance to meet with him this
afternoon, could I have five minutes to meet
with him?
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THE COURT: All right. We'll give you five
minutes.
MR. HUMPHERYS: He's a rebuttal witness to
this testimony. We have been hustling to get
this ready.
(T. 1370-71, emphasis added.)

While Mr. Humpherys characterized

Dr. Cook as a "rebuttal witness" the reference to attempting to
rebut "this testimony" was unclear.

(Id.)

that "this testimony" refers to Dr. Olsen.

Mrs. Brady now argues
As has been shown,

Dr. Olsen did not offer testimony that permitted rebuttal
evidence.
Rebuttal testimony is discussed at length in 75 AM. JUR.
2d, Trial,

§ 365 et seq.

The authors state:

Rebuttal is evidence given to prove,
disprove, explain, repel, or contradict the
evidence of the adversary party.
Id. at 566 (1991) (emphasis added).

The authors also state:

The standard for determining whether a
rebuttal witness should be allowed to testify
when such witness's name was not timely
identified is dependent upon whether the
testimony sought to be rebutted could
reasonably have been anticipated prior to
trial. Thus, where the relevance and
existence of rebuttal evidence is not known
until the other side has presented its case,
the trial court does not commit an abuse of
discretion by permitting the rebuttal
although the rebuttal witness was not listed
prior to trial. However, a previously
undisclosed rebuttal witness may offer
testimony only about that which tends to
counteract new matter offered by the adverse
party.
In determining whether to deny a party the
right to call a rebuttal witness, the trial
court should weigh the possibility of
substantial prejudice against the denial of
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the right to present the proffered testimony.
Id. at § 371, pp. 570-71 (emphasis added).
Permitting Dr. Cook to testify as a rebuttal witness
was improper for two reasons.

First, the testimony sought to be

rebutted was known to all parties prior to trial.

Only two

persons could conceivably have addressed the issue of a
peripheral vision deficit--Dr. Charlton and Dr. Olsen.
Dr. Charlton was Mrs. Brady's treating physician and was deposed
prior to trial.

Dr. Olsen was a witness for Xittrium, Baxter and

Mountain View Hospital and Mrs. Brady and was also deposed prior
to trial.

Therefore, Mr. Humpherys knew full well what both

individuals were going to say.

Having Dr. Cook testify about a

peripheral vision deficit did not rebut unanticipated testimony.
Second, undisclosed rebuttal witnesses may testify only
about new matters offered by the adverse party.

Dr. Gibb did not

offer any new evidence whatsoever concerning the presence or
absence of a peripheral vision deficit in Mrs. Brady.
Mr. Humpherys created the peripheral vision issue himself by
having Mrs. Brady testify about the deficit for the first time at
trial.

(T. 1071-72, 1086-89.)

Mr. Humpherys then brought in

Dr. Cook and had him testify about a new matter that he himself
had created.

This use of "rebuttal" testimony is completely

improper and was highly prejudicial to Dr. Gibb.
Rebuttal evidence is "evidence which tends to answer or
explain his adversary's evidence."
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Soliz v. Ammerman, 16 Utah 2d

11, 395 P.2d 25, 26 (1964).

In Board of Educ. v. Barton, 617

P.2d 347 (Utah 1980) , the Supreme Court stated:
Rebuttal evidence is that which tends to
refute, or to so modify or explain, as to
nullify or minimize the effect of the
opponent's evidence.
Id. (citation omitted).

See also, Randle v. Allen, 223 Utah Adv.

Rep. 6, 11 (Utah 1993) (citing Board of Educ. v. Barton); Jenson
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 49 P.2d 958 (Utah 1935).

The Utah Supreme

Court's position underscores the fact that rebuttal testimony is
proper only to address the opponent's evidence, not to
substantiate a party's new trial testimony.

In this case, Mrs.

Brady's own witness, Dr. Charlton, testified that she had 20/30
vision.

(T. 693, 700.)

Despite conducting numerous thorough

tests, Dr. Charlton failed to detect any peripheral vision
defect.

Again, this testimony is from Mrs. Brady's own treating

physician, an individual who had been thoroughly deposed before
trial.
The nature of rebuttal testimony is discussed further
in the Supreme Court of Alaska decision in Sirotiak v. H.C. Price
Co.. 758 P.2d 1271 (Alaska 1988) . In Sirotiak. the plaintiff
filed suit and claimed damages as a result of an intersection
collision.

Plaintiff Sirotiak attempted to introduce the

testimony of two witnesses in rebuttal after he had completed his
case in chief.

Finding that the proposed rebuttal witness was
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not on the plaintiff's witness list, that the plaintiff was not
surprised by the defense theory and that the testimony sought to
be rebutted could reasonably have been anticipated prior to
trial, the Sirotiak court upheld the trial court's refusal to
permit the rebuttal testimony and stated:
In general, evidence which is necessary to
prove a prima facie case should be presented
in the plaintiff's case in chief. Although
the plaintiff is not required to anticipate
defenses as part of its case in chief, the
plaintiff may not ignore known defense
theories or close his or her eyes to evidence
that directly counters plaintiff's prima
facie case.
Id. at 1278 (emphasis added, citations omitted).

In this case,

Mr. Humpherys chose to close his eyes to the testimony of
Dr. Charlton as well as the testimony of Dr. Olsen.

The

deposition testimony of Dr. Olsen was known to Mr. Humpherys well
before trial.

It was incumbent upon Mr. Humpherys to find a

witness such as Dr. Cook well before trial and to advise defense
counsel of the identity of the witness as well as the nature of
his testimony.

The failure to do so and the attempt to

characterize it as "rebuttal evidence" for the first time at the
end of trial is improper.
The testimony of Dr. Cook is not a matter that can be
dismissed as something insignificant.

Introducing testimony that

Mrs. Brady suffered from a peripheral vision deficit as well as
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vision deficit.

It is equally unlikely that he would err in the

measurement of her visual acuity.

To find Dr. Cook to be

qualified to testify about complicated issues of a specialized
area of ophthalmology is improper.

To permit him to so testify

after the most cursory examination of Mrs. Brady in the middle of
trial is also prejudicial error.
C.
DR. COOK WAS A SURPRISE WITNESS WHO SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO TESTIFY.
Mrs. Brady argues that Dr. Cook was not a surprise
witness because Mr. Humpherys "notified" counsel for Dr. Gibb
about Dr. Cook during the noon break immediately preceding
Dr. Cook's testimony.

Ignoring for a moment the fact that there

is no evidence in the record of any such "notice," the fact
remains that Mrs. Brady misunderstands the nature of surprise
testimony as a basis for a new trial.

In Anderson v. Bradley,

590 P.2d 339 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
In any event, surprise as a ground for a new
trial is only that which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against.
Id.

In this case, Mr. Stott had no way of guarding against the

surprise use of Dr. Cook as a witness.

Counsel had filed

interrogatories which sought the identification of all witnesses
well before trial. Dr. Cook was never identified as a possible
witness.

Furthermore, Dr. Cook was never identified in the
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2 5 5 , 16 ] ) I f

iizel , one can reasonably

. :m: .ar number * . a .ij.. e known Dr. Cook. A s
>1 1

Judge Bunnell pointed out, many would likely have been Dr. Cook's
patients.

It is reasonable to assume that a potential juror

would lend greater credence to the testimony of his or her own
treating optometrist.

Mr. Stott was entitled to know about this

information during the jury selection process.

This right was

denied when Dr. Cook was held out from Mrs. Brady's case in chief
and belatedly inserted as a "rebuttal witness."
The surprise use of Dr. Cook also precluded Mr. Stott
from doing a thorough investigation of Dr. Cook and his actual
qualifications to testify as an expert witness.

Counsel for

Dr. Gibb have learned that Dr. Cook was named as a respondent in
a medical malpractice action involving the allegedly negligent
diagnosis of a corneal ulceration.

Some of the details relating

to this claim are set forth in the Notice of Intent to Commence
Legal Action which is attached to Dr. Gibb's Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for New Trial and/or Remittitur as Exhibit "A."
(R. 1578-80.)

While probably not admissible by itself, this type

of information may well lead to the discovery of a pattern of
such claims for other admissible evidence.

Without having had

the opportunity to depose Dr. Cook, Mr. Stott had no way of
learning about the claim of Doris Rarick or any other claims
against Dr. Cook.

As it turns out, Mr. Stott may have been the
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:* ^:._.ui:i tav-j been

obvious to Judge Bunnell that he was committing error in
permitting the introduction of exhibits 64 and 65 into evidence.
(T. 1376.)

These exhibits purported to reflect results of a test

called "a visual field."

The visual field was explained as a

"series of spots or lights that are projected so that we can
evaluate the side vision of Mrs. Brady."

(T. 1374.)

Even

without Mr. Stott's objection as to foundation for these
exhibits, the court permitted their introduction without knowing
whether the visual field test was appropriate to diagnose a
peripheral vision loss in a patient with cornea damage, whether
Dr. Cook had ever performed a single visual field test on another
patient before Mrs. Brady, whether the equipment used was proper
or was properly maintained, adjusted or calibrated and whether
the visual field test had ever been recognized in any court of
law as a scientifically recognized test for measuring peripheral
vision loss.
It should have been obvious to Judge Bunnell that
permitting Exhibits 64 and 65 to go to the jury in the manner in
which they did was plain error.

These exhibits gave the jurors

something tangible to review during their deliberations on
liability and damages -- something tangible that had never even
been mentioned by Mr. Humpherys before the exhibits showed up in
court on the last day of trial.

It is interesting to note that
44

M r . Hi impher ys floes i lot: asser t: tl la t tl lese exi li bi ts w ei e iiientii oned
in the so-called "new notice" 1 of Di:

Cook's upcoming testimony

ri"--. eleventh-hoi IT n^p of such exhibi ts should have immediately
•."--* • • ; "

t o l..lIP u n f a i r ness and tl: le prejudicial

effect the exhibits would have on the right

to Dr. Gibb to have a

fair oppor*: .:rr! • • t.o review and possibly rebut the p-xh ib;i l;.s ,
•MI
that the
137 1 ^

-*

1 L'om the transcript of Dr. Cook's

was anxious to conclude the trial

("C"

testimony

1367-68,

N v e i i h e l e s s , the haste to conclude the proceedings does

jiol fnovide an excuse for denying Dr. Gibb the fair opportunity
to know about and moot
65.

Dr , Cook's testimony and Exhibits 64 and

The plain solul ion wuulil hivi* l^-oii f m

D r . Cook from testifying.

1 ho (iiuit

I

pi^i/enl

The failure to do so was plain error.
i.

TESTIMONY I I fto
Until

o k testified, : u- -violence before the jury

from ophthalmologists was that M r s , Brady had good
visio

,

functional

Hoc (, y in ophthalmologist , Di . Chai'H on, had testified

that the corrected vision in both eyes was 2 0/3(1,

(T, i-i'-M, 700 )
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Exidine «V.K; no different
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changed only from natural aging or other unrelated factors.
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critical point in the trial, an unknown optometrist was permitted
to testify.

Under the commonly accepted principles of primacy

and recency of evidence, the time immediately before the case is
submitted to the jury is critical.

Mr. Humpherys made the most

of this advantage by calling Dr. Cook at the end of the evidence
and then vigorously emphasizing Dr. Cook's testimony in his
closing argument.
Mr. Humpherys argued:
The third category is disability, and this is
not an insignificant item either. You heard
how her peripheral vision has been
significantly affected, her depth perception.
And this become particularly important as you
grow older; when your body isn't quite as
agile and your reflexes aren't quite as quick
and your balance isn't quite as sharp, and
you don't have that depth perception. We
start to become disabled because you can't
move like you could before. You can't see
the way you should. You can't drive in a
safe manner because of the inability to see
what's going on to the side of you. There is
a significant disability associated with the
loss of sight.
Now her central vision is okay. Dr. Charlton
said 20/30. Dr. Cook said 20/60. It doesn't
matter. I don't care what the difference is.
It's okay, the central vision. The central
vision means where her eye is actually
looking at the time she is focusing. But the
surrounding vision is what is impaired and
significantly impaired.
(T. 1474-75.)

46

She's at a higher risk of accident because of
her depth perception and her peripheral
vision being impaired.
(T. 1 4 76, )
I ii:

I I/i in ipher y s cl osed b;y saying i
Now, I have to confess that
wl id ch I did
yesterday -- that Dr. Cook was requested by
us to look at her eye. And the reason why is
because of what they read from, Dr. Olsen, who
had never examined Mrs. Brady. And in the
deposition testimony he said, "I expect
she'll have no problems with her vision. She
will live a normal life and do everything
she'll need to do." That isn't what
Dr. Charlton said. But in light of what
Dr. Olsen said and since they told us they
were going to read that deposition that day,
I though (sic), "No, that's not right. We
better find out, because this is our last
chance to talk to you about it. We better
find out: what her vision really is concerning
her peripheral vision." Dr. Charlton only
measured her central vision. And so that's .
why that was done. And I freely admit that I
requested that and suggested that and Keith
carried it out. And thank goodness we did,
because she would not be compensated, nor
would you understand the depth and scope of
her injuries, had I not done that. I'm not
ashamed of that. That wasn't fabricated.

Then it dawned on me. And that's why we
brought in Dr. Cook to make sure that you
understood the scope and the extent of her
injuries.
("!". 153 5 -36. )
1. -• • '-....

vision •: j, in' t ma11 er" t o Mr, Humphe rys .

The supposed peripheral vision problem di d,
47

The peripheral

vision was the focus of his argument to the jury that Mrs. Brady
should be compensated.

Mrs. Brady herself had testified that the

peripheral vision problem was the "main thing":
Q.

Okay. Other than those problems, you
don't have any other difficulties with
your right eye, do you -- those that
we've now talked about?

A.

This side vision and that is the main
thing right now.

(T. 1086.)

The peripheral vision was turned into the main issue

of damages through Dr. Cook's testimony.

Dr. Gibb had absolutely

no way to meaningfully contest Dr. Cook's testimony.

Without

Dr. Cook's testimony, the value of the case was measured by the
undeniable inconvenience and pain and suffering related to the
cornea transplant and the residual problems of the dryness in the
eye.

With Dr. Cook's testimony, the value of the case changed

dramatically to an eye with 20/60 acuity and peripheral vision
deficits that put Mrs. Brady at risk for a number of different
speculative future problems.

The award of $300,000 in general

damages speaks volumes.
CONCLUSION
The jury instructions given in this case permitted the
jury to impermissibly decide the case as if it involved no more
complicated than tasks which each of the jurors faced in everyday
life.

The education, training, experience and skill involved in
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the operation performed by Dr.. Gibb are not: such simple m a t t e r s .
Tn& standard oi" ••a1- ^-MPt b e defined by expert testimony and the
I

i 11: :i 1 :i z e on3 ) expert t es t imony in

assessing Dr.

Gibb'^ n e g l i g e n c e ,

The jury i nstructions given in

this ^as& permit* ed a. departi ire from the pi: sper ] egal
a .. . - _,

.-.-

^r reversal

The testimony of D r

standard

Barry Cook

came as a complete s-irprise to counsel for D r . Gibb and cannot b e
explained avn-.- •: ••- - < - / ' al test: mon>

T h e err or committed :i i i

permitting Dr. , Cook t.o testify is also grounds for reversal
Gibb respectfully requests that the judgment of the trial court
be reversed

and l: 'h< ,'ase remanded N,i ,i n»ri i t i i . i l .
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GARY D. STOTT [A313 0]
CURTIS J. DRAKE [A091Q]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party
Defendant Randal B. Gibb, M.D.
50 South Main Street
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT C. BRADY
and MARJORIE A. BRADY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Division of PACIFICORP, an
Oregon corporation, ANNETTE
GRIMM, MOUNTAIN VIEW
HOSPITAL, DR. RANDAL B.
GIBB, DR. CLISTO D. BEATY,
XITTRIUM LABORATORIES,
a Delaware corporation,

*
*
*
*
*

ORDER RE:
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Defendants.

Civil No. 900700158PI
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Division of PACIFICORP,

*
*
*
*

Third-Party Plaintiff,

Judge Boyd Bunnell

vs.
MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL
and DR. RANDAL B. GIBB,

*

Third-Party Defendants.

*

001 St.* 0

The

Motion

of

defendant/third-party

defendant

Dr. Randal B. Gibb ("Dr. Gibb") for New Trial and/or Remittitur and
the

Motion

of

Laboratories

defendants/third-party

and Baxter

Healthcare

defendants

Corporation

Xittrium

and defendant

Mountain View Hospital ("Xittrium", "Baxter" and "Mountain View
Hospital", respectively) for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict,
New Trial and/or Remittitur came regularly before the court on the
5th day of March, 1993 at the hour of 1:30 p.m.
Marjorie A. Brady

("Mrs. Brady") appeared

Plaintiff

by and through her

counsel, L. Rich Humpherys; defendant Dr. Gibb appeared by and
through his counsel, Curtis J. Drake; and defendants Xittrium,
Baxter and Mountain View Hospital appeared by and through their
counsel,
considered

Charles P.

Sampson

and Bruce T. Jones.

the above motions, memoranda

in support

The court
thereof,

previously filed pleadings and the evidence submitted at the time
of trial, together with all other information contained in the
court's file, and found and concluded as follows:
1.

For the reasons set forth in Plaintiff's Directed

Verdict on the Statute of Limitation Defense, the court concludes
that

the statute

§ 78-15-3

of limitation

contained

in Utah

Code Ann.

(as amended) does not bar Mrs. Brady's claim against

Xittrium and Baxter.

2

n m on .

2.

The court cannot conclude as a matter of law that

the negligence, if any, of Dr. Gibb was a superseding cause of
Mrs. Brady's injuries, thereby precluding the proximate cause of
the other defendants' fault.

The issue of causation was an issue

of fact that was properly presented to the jury to determine.
3.

Plaintiffs did not initially allege that Xittrium

and Baxter were negligent; however, Dr. Gibb raised the issue of
Xittrium's

and

Baxter's

negligence

and

sought

to

have

such

negligence, together will all other fault, apportioned by the jury
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (as amended).

Evidence on

the issue of said negligence was submitted to the jury during the
trial.

The court deemed it appropriate and necessary to have the

jury consider and apportion said negligence as part of determining
the fault proximately causing Mrs. Brady's injuries.

Even if it

was improper for the court to have the issue of Xittrium's and
Baxter's negligence considered by the jury, the court finds and
concludes that it was harmless error since the jury found the
product defective and unreasonably dangerous, which finding was
supported by substantial evidence.

The jury's apportionment of

fault to Xittrium and Baxter did not appear excessive in light of
the evidence.
4.

The court properly permitted

Dr. Fraunfelder to

testify regarding the alleged improper actions of Mountain View
3

001 P/V,;

Hospital.

Dr. Fraunfelder's opinions were not precluded merely

because he did not mention them in his deposition.

It does not

appear that counsel for Mountain View Hospital specifically asked
Dr. Fraunfelder whether he had any opinions regarding the actions
of Mountain View Hospital and whether he thereafter intended to
form any such opinions. Counsel for Mountain View Hospital did not
even ask if Dr. Fraunf elder had any other opinions; however, the
question was asked by another attorney.

Even if counsel for

Mountain View Hospital had asked if Dr. Fraunfelder had any other
opinions, such general question is overly broad and can be unfairly
used to conclusively restrict an expert's opinion as the case
develops after the deposition. Under certain circumstances, it may
be unfair to allow an expert to give additional opinions. However,
in this case, the opinions of Dr. Fraunf elder against Mountain View
Hospital did not unduly prejudice the hospital, particularly in
light of all other evidence, the position of Xittrium and Baxter,
and the ultimate determination of fault by the jury.
5.

The court concludes and finds that the payments by

defendant/third-party plaintiff Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L")
to the plaintiffs were based on advances toward UP&L's liability as
a

tort

feasor

and

not

a

collateral

source.

Under

such

circumstances, the payments made by UP&L do not fall within the
definition of collateral source as defined by Utah Code Ann.
4

n r\ A r> ^

§ 78-14-4.5 (as amended).

For this reason, Mountain View Hospital

is not entitled to a set off for said payments under said Section
of the Code.

The obligation of UP&L did not arise out of any

collateral duty or agreement outside of its tort liability.
6.

The court finds that the issue with respect to the

admissibility

of

the

testimony

of

Dr. Barry

Cook

and

the

admissibility of Exhibits 64 and 65 are very close calls. However,
the court finds that Dr. Cook's testimony was proper rebuttal
concerning evidence relative to the condition of Mrs. Brady's eye
after the injury and the way the eye had recovered.

With respect

to the issue of Dr. Cook's credibility as a local witness, the
court finds that the claim made against Dr. Cook was written up in
the papers and received notoriety in the community.

The issue of

the credibility of the witness is for the jury to take into account
with the guidance of jury instructions on credibility of witnesses.
The court further finds that it is a close call as to whether or
not

Dr. Cook's

surprise.

testimony

and

Exhibits 64

and 65

constituted

However, the court concludes that a new trial is not

warranted on that basis because the evidence was proper rebuttal to
the denial of the amount of damage.
7.

The court cannot conclude as a matter of law that

the amount awarded in general damages was excessive in light of all

5
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of the evidence.

Mrs. Brady sustained a serious eye injury and

there was substantial evidence to support the award.
8.

With respect to the question of conflicting jury

instructions, the court finds that a common knowledge exception to
the requirement for expert testimony exists. The common knowledge
exception applied to establishing the duty of care in this case.
The common knowledge exception would also apply and, at the same
time, expert testimony was required to establish whether or not
there was a duty of care and whether or not there was a breach of
that duty. Instruction No. 18 and Instruction No. 20 were given in
an attempt to answer both of the rulings of the Utah Supreme Court
in this area.

The court notes that both Instruction No. 18 and

Instruction No. 20 are in the proposed uniform jury instructions
without any explanation except the citations to the cases from
which they come.

Both instructions are recognized and it is an

extremely close call as to whether or not the jury would be mislead
by giving both instructions.

The court finds that any error in

giving the instructions would be more or less harmless since there
was sufficient evidence by way of expert testimony from which the
jury could find malpractice on the part of Dr. Gibb. If the giving
of the instructions is in error, some exception and clarification
to the proposed uniform jury instructions needs to be given by the
Supreme Court.
6
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9.
of Limitation

The proposed Plaintiff's Directed Verdict on Statute
Defense should be modified to read that the

court

specifically finds that the plaintiffs were aware that Exidine had
caused

the

Otherwise,

injury

to Mrs. Brady's

right

the plaintiffs' proposed

eye by August 7,

order

appears

to

1989.

accurately

reflect the court's ruling.
Based upon the above findings and conclusions, together
with the other points and arguments of plaintiffs as contained in
their memoranda in opposition to defendants' various motions, the
court denies all post judgment motions.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Dr. Gibb's Motion for New Trial and/or Remittitur is

2.

Xittrium, Baxter and Mountain View Hospital's Motion

denied.

for

Judgment

Notwithstanding

the

Verdict,

a

New

Trial

and/or

Remittitur is hereby denied.

DATED this

^ 5 V day of

/^^//

, 1993.

BY THE COURT:

-fiONORABLE/fiOYt) BUNNEU;
/ ^ - S e v e n t h / D i s t r i c t JGcige
Approved as to form:
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

By:
L. RICH HUMPHERYS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON

By:
CHARLES P. SAMPSON
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party
Defendants Mountain View Hospital,
Inc., Xittrium Laboratories and
Baxter Healthcare Corporation
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on
this ~^3, \A day of April, 1993, to the following counsel of record:
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Keith H. Chiara, Esq.
37 East Main Street
P.O. Box 955
Price, Utah 84601
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Stephen B. Nebeker, Esq.
Rick L. Rose, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street, Suite 400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party
Plaintiff Utah Power & Light Company and
Defendant Annette Grimm
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq.
Bruce T. Jones, Esq.
Charles P. Sampson, Esq.
Paul M. Simmons, Esq.
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party
Defendants Mountain View Hospital, Inc.,
Xittrium Laboratories and Baxter Healthcare
Corporation
8

J. Anthony Eyre, Esq.
William W. Barrett, Esq.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Clisto D. Beaty
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT C. BRADY and MARJORIE A. ]
BRADY,
)
Plaintiffs,

ORDER OF THE COURT
ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
]
Division of PACIFICORP, an
]
Oregon corporation, ANNETTE
]
GRIMM, MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL, ]
DR. RANDAL B. GIBB, DR. CLISTO ]
D. BEATY, XITTRIUM LABORATORIES,]
a Delaware corporation,
]
i
Defendants,
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a
Division of PACIFICORP, an
Oregon corporation,
Third-Party
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 900700158PI

]
]
;
]
]

MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL and
DR. RANDAL B. GIBB,
Third-Party
Defendants.

The attorneys for the plaintiffs and for Dr. Randal B.
Gibb have each submitted to the Court a proposed order relative to
the Court's rulings on post-trial motions heard by the Court and
ruled upon from the bench on March 5, 1993.

001 70

The Court has considered both proposed orders and the
objection filed, and has concluded that in the very limited area
where the Proposed Orders disagree, that the proposed order
submitted by counsel for Dr. Gibb sufficiently and adequately
states the rulings of the Court.
Therefore, the Court has this day signed and filed the
Order submitted by Gary D. Scott and Curtis J. Drake, attorneys for
Dr. Gibb.
DATED this

3^-

day of May, 1993.

-2-

np 1 7iv;

CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the above entitled ORDER OF THE COURT ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

by

depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to
the following:
Gary D. Stott
Curtis J. Drake
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys at Law
50 South Main Street
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
P. O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City UT
84110-2465
Keith H. Chiara
Attorney at Lawis
37 East Main Street
Price UT

84501

L. Rich Humpherys
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys at Law
175 South West Temple, #510
Salt Lake City UT
84101
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.
Bruce T. Jones
Charles P. Sampson
Paul M. Simmons
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys at Law
700 Clark Learning Office center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City UT
84101-1480
Stephen B. Nebeker
Rich L Rose
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street, Suite 400
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City UT
84145-0385

-3-

J. Anthony Eyre
William W. Barrett
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
Attorneys at Law
City Centre I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City UT
84111

DATED this 5*£*ix
S> ^ day of May, 1993

Secretary
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ADDENDUM 2

INSTRUCTION No.

2£

Expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the
standard of care owed to the plaintiff by defendant Dr. Randall
B. Gibb and Mountain View Hospital in a medical malpractice case
where the medical procedure is of a kind, or the outcome so
offends commonly held notions of medical propriety, that the
standards of care can be established by the common knowledge,
experience and understanding of a layman.

Instrc7

n f\

H

r \ H«

ADDENDUM 3

INSTRUCTION NO.

c

The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the
opinions of a witness to be received as evidence.

An exception

to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses.

Witnesses

who, by education, study and experience, have become expert in
some art, science, profession or calling, may state opinions as
to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an
expert, so long as it is material and relevant to the case.

You

should consider such expert opinion and the reasons, if any,
given for it.

You are not bound by such an opinion.

weight you think it deserves.

Give it the

If you should decide that the

opinions of an expert witness are not based upon sufficient
education and experience, or if you should conclude that the
reasons given in support of the opinions are not sound, or that
such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard
the opinion entirely.

INSTRUCTION NO.

d

In deciding whether a physician properly fulfilled his
or her duties, you are not permitted to use a standard derived
from your own experience with physicians nor any other standard
of your own.
A physician is required to exercise the same degree of
learning, care, skill and treatment ordinarily possessed and used
by other qualified physicians in good standing practicing in the
same medical field.

The law does not require that a physician

exercise the highest degree of care.

It requires the physician

to exercise the degree of care that other qualified physicians
would ordinarily exercise under the same circumstances.

r\ t\ -i r i r*.

INSTRUCTION NO.

4-

The only way you may properly learn the applicable
standard of care and determine whether or not the defendant
physicians conformed to it is through evidence presented during
this trial by individuals testifying as expert witnesses who knew
of that standard as it existed at that time, and by other
evidence admitted for the purpose of defining the standard of
care.

INSTRUCTION '(f /
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the
testimony of medical experts, you may compare and weigh the
opinion of one expert against that of another.

In doing this,

you may consider the relative qualifications and credibility of
the expert witnesses, as well as the reasons for each opinion and
the facts and other matters on which such opinions are based.

INSTRUCTION NO
The

fact that

.0

an expert witness resides or pursues the

profession in another state or community should not affect the
weight you give the witness7 testimony.

A party may rely upon

qualified experts from other states and countries in presenting
evidence to the jury.

INSTRUCTION NO.

,1
2.
S J

A physician who undertakes to treat a patient does not
guarantee that no complications will occur or that no adverse
results will be experienced because of the treatment.

The fact

that a complication or adverse result occurs does not, by itself,
imply or prove that the physician was negligent.

0 ,0 1 A n ,

ADDENDUM 4

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
ooOoo
ROBERT C. BRADY and
MARJORIE A. BRADY,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 900700158PI

vs.
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Division of PACIFICORP, an
Oregon corporation, ANNETTE
GRIMM, MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL,
DR. RANDAL B. GIBB, and
DR. CLISTO D. BEATY,

Deposition of:
MARJORIE A. BRADY

Defendants.

CERTIFIED
COPY

UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
a Division of PACIFICORP#
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
MOUNTAIN VIEW HOSPITAL and
DR. RANDAL B. GIBB,
Third-Party
Defendants.
-ooOoo
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 26th day of July, 1991,
the deposition of MARJORIE A. BRADY, produced as a witness
herein at the instance of the Defendants Utah Power & Light and
Annette Grimm herein, in the above-entitled action now pending
in the above-named court, was taken before Ann M. Calder, a
Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and for the
State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 10:35 a.m. of said day
at Carbon County Courthouse, 149 East 100 South, Price, County
of Carbon, State of Utah.
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Notice.

ANN M. CALDER
CSRNo. 139

INDEPENDENT REPORTING
SERVICE
Certified Shorthand Reporters

1710 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)538-2333

time.

We're talking the week after the accident and the

week, I guess, after Christmas.
A.

Just running and scratchy and uncomfortable.

Q.

Were you having pain in any other parts of your body

or was that primarily the pain that seemed to mask everything
else?
A.

No, no, no, I got along fine.

I mean

—

Q.

In recovering from that type of surgery?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You still had a cast on your foot, of course?

A.

Right.

Q.

Were you taking medication at that time during that

period, say, from the accident up until Christmas?

I'm

talking about pain medication.
A.

I'm sure I was.

Q.

Do you remember what it was?

A.

Nope.

Q.

Tylenol?

A.

Probably Tylenol 3, I'd imagine.

Q.

What about the week after Christmas?

A.

I wasn't on pain pills very long.

Q.

Say from the 25th up until the end of the year?

A.

I don't know the dates.

Q.

But in any event, you started seeing Dr. Dafler in

Price.

I'm sure the record would show when that was.

Would
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surgery?
A.

He didn't have the equipment here.

Q.

And then the records, I think, show that on April 11,

1989, is when you had your surgery for your cornea
transplant?
A.

That's right.

Q.

That was done in Salt Lake City?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was that done in the hospital?

A.

No.

Q.

Or right at the —

A.

At a clinic.

Q.

At the clinic there, the eye clinic in Salt Lake?

A.

No, they took me to the Surgical Center.

Q.

During this period of time we're talking about

February, March, —

actually it's three months, January,

February, March, into the middle of April, tell me what pain,
if any, you experienced in your eye.
A.

As I said, all it was was an irritation, a

scratching, eyes running.
Q.

Did that continue about the same through that three

and a half month period?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ever get any relief from it?

A.

Yes, Dr. Dafler kept giving me different soothing —
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Q.

After you had your corneal transplant how did your

eye feel after that?
A.

Pretty good*

Q.

Did that immediately restore your vision?

A.

Not immediately, but it got better quickly.

It just

really was amazing at how quick it did come back.
Q.

Change night to day, so to speak?

A.

It did real well.

Q.

Had you totally lost the sight in that right eye

before you had your corneal transplant?
A.

It wasn't black but it was shadow.

Q.

You still had normal vision in your left eye?

A.

Right.

Q.

How long did it take after your corneal transplant

until your vision returned to what it is now?
A*

I could see pretty good the next day, but it took it

weeks, maybe months.
Q.

It's leveled off now, has it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How is your vision now?

A.

Pretty good.

Q.

Do you know what your visual acuity is in your right

eye now?

A.

I think he said 20/30.

Q.

What about in your left eye?
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A.

No.

Q.

They look like they're in pretty good condition.

A.

Yes, they're not too bad.

I haven't been to the

dentist for a year, but last time I went it was okay.
Q.

Do you have any problems with your eye now other

than what you've described for me, your right eye?
A.

Other than it does get dry and I have to keep — I

have to put medication in it three times a day and then the
ointment at night to keep it moist; I probably always will.
Q.

Dr. Charlton has requested that you do that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And the vision, you've described your vision as

being pretty good with your glasses?
A.

Pretty good.

Q.

You can see well enough to do everything you did

before?
A.

Pretty well.

Q.

You sew?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you do needlepoint?

A.

I do handwork, yes.

Q.

Is it needlepoint?

A.

No, I don't do needlepoint.

Embroidery work and

craftwork.
Q.

Do you have any other hobbies other than that?

75

Ann Calder, Certified Shorthand Reporter

you're really seeing now would be Dr. Charlton?
A.

I had a complete —

last year.
thing —

that was October, so that was

I had a complete checkup from Dr. Etzel, annual

well, it should be annual, it usually goes a couple

of years.

But I had one in October.

Q.

That would have been last year?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you pass that with flying colors?

A.

I passed it fine.

Q.

Your general health is still good?

A.

Very good.

I'd say this accident has slowed me do*m

considerably.
Q.

Tell me how it has slowed you down.

A.

Well, I don't hop out of bed and move the furniture

around and wash the windows and everything like I used to.
It takes me until about noon, then I move something.

It has.

slowed me down.
Q.

Have you had to cut out any activities that you had

before?
A.

I'm not as much fun as I was before.

Q.

I don't know, you must have been pretty good before.

You're pretty good now.

You're still taking a trip with your

husband?
A.

You bet.

Q.

And you're walking, you said, on a regular basis;
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right?
A.

Right.

Q.

You're still active in your church?

A.

Very.

Q.

You still, I guess, are involved with your children

and grandchildren?
A.

Every chance we get.

Q.

Extens ively?

A.

You bet, very.

Q.

It sounds to me like the problem you're dealing with

now, you've mentioned the numbness and slobbering and the
problem with your lip.

Then you've mentioned these problems

you've had with your eye from time to time of having to have
stitches removed or corrected?
A.

There's strain, strain to the eyes and dryness. Now

this eye doesn't close completely now because of the nerve
that's cut there.

Although they put the cheek there that

holds it up, it still does not close completely.
dry.

So it gets

So there's just a dry, irritating feeling there.

Q.

Do you have to put some —

A.

Drops.

Q.

—

A.

He told me to just use artificial tears there to

in that eye, too?

keep it moist.
Q.

And that seems to help okay?
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Q.

Can you describe how your vision is different since

the accident?

You said you were seeing 20/30 in one and

20/30 in the other, I understand?
A.

I said I wasn't sure what it was in the left side.

It's just that sometimes when my eye gets scratchy or watery,
like looking at this paper it's blurry.

Then if I look at it

real close for a while I can see it.
Q.

Do you generally read the newspaper at night?

A.

Not often.

Q.

Do you take the newspaper?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Since the accident have you read any books?

A.

No# I study scriptures and that for my Relief

Society.
Q.

Are you able to read your scriptures all right?

A.

Like I said, if I focus clearly.

Q.

What size of print are your scriptures printed?

A.

Ordinary.

Q.

You say ordinary?

A.

I don't have this big print.

Q.

It isn't an enlarged print?

A.

No.

Q.

Are you able to read your Relief Society manual all

right?
A.

Like I said, again, when I focus it just right.
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ADDENDUM 5
Rule 51.

Instructions to jury; objections

At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as
the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action
upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally
or otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions are to
be given in writing, all objections thereto must be made before
the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may
be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an
instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the
foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and
in the interests of justice, may review the giving of or failure
to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make
objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of the
jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made
after the court has instructed the jury. The court shall not
comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court states any
of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.

ADDENDUM 6
RULE 103(a) and (d)

Rulings on Evidence

(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless
a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike
appear of record, stating the specific ground of objection,
if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made
known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context
within which questions were asked.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes
taking notice of plan errors affecting substantial rights
although they were not brought to the attention of the court.

ADDENDUM 7
RULE 104 (a)

Preliminary Questions

(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary
questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges.

ADDENDUM 8
RULE 702

Testimony by experts

If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of
the foregoing instrument was mailed, first-class, postage
prepaid, on this j JK/ day of November, 1993, to the following
counsel of record:
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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